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ARTICLES
Trade and Health:
The Global Spread of Diseases and International Trade
By David P. Fidler"
Introduction
In the last twenty years, public health officials have come to recognize that the
traditional distinction between national and international health has been shattered
by the processes of globalization.1 At the end of the twentieth century, sovereign
States no longer can protect the health of their citizens without international co-
operation.2 Elsewhere I have called this phenomenon the 'globalization of public
"I would like to thank the American Society of International Law International Economic
Law Interest Group for giving me the opportunity to present my views on the trade and health
linkage at its December 1997 Conference on "Linkages as Phenomenon: An Interdisciplinary
Approach." Feedback from the Conference participants, particularly Steve Charnovitz, was
very helpful. I would also like to thank Dr. Allyn L. Taylor for her help on the tobacco-related
parts of my analysis. I also thankJ. Alexander Tanford for his assistance on the use of science in
litigation before American federal courts. I appreciate the research assistance and editing help
I received from Cynthia Baraban and Mary Ann Torres.
1U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Addressing Emerging Infectious Disease
Threats: A Prevention Strategy for the United States, 1994, 12 [hereinafter CDC Strategy] (ar-
guing that the "concept of 'domestic' as distinct from 'international' health is outdated"); Seth
F. Berkley, AIDS in the Global Village: Why U.S. Physicians Should Care About HIV Outside
the United States, Journal of the American Medical Association, vol. 268, 1992, 3368, 3369
(arguing that the distinction between domestic and international health is obsolete); George A.
Gellert et al., The Obsolescence of Distinct Domestic and International Health Sectors, Journal
of Public Health Policy, vol. 10, 1989, 421, 421 (arguing that "traditional and historical bases
for differentiating domestic and international health in Western nations have ... lost mean-
ing");James W. LeDuc, World Health Organization Strategy for Emerging Infectious Diseases,
Journal of the American Medical Association, vol. 275, 1996, 318, 318 (proposing that national
health has become an international challenge).
2 National Science and Technology Council Committee on International Science, Engi-
neering, and Technology Working Groupon Emerging and Re-Emerging Infectious Diseases,
Infectious Diseases - A Global Health Threat, 1995, 11 [hereinafter CISET Rep.] (arguing that
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health'.3 The scope of global health problems is staggering and frightening. Not only
does the world face a global crisis in emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases4 but
also in global pandemic of chronic diseases caused in many cases by the consumption
of tobacco products.' The massive health threats from pathogenic microbes and
tobacco consumption are bad enough but are not the end of the global health crisis
at the end of the twentieth century. Recently the World Health Organization
(WHO) reported that the world also confronts an obesity epidemic, the impact of
which "is so diverse and extreme that it should now be regarded as one of the greatest
neglected public health problems of our time with an impact on health which may
well prove to be as great as that of smoking."6
A major factor in the development of the globalization of public health is interna-
tional trade. Pathogenic microbes move about the world as hitchhikers in interna-
tional commerce. Cigarettes and other tobacco products reach new markets through
international trade. The growth of the global market, and the role of international
trade in creating and maintaining that market, has helped create more sedentary life-
styles and unhealthy eating habits in many countries. Each of the infectious disease,
tobacco-related disease, and obesity examples underscores the powerful connection
between trade and health.
The linkage between trade and health has, however, been overshadowed in inter-
national trade literature until recently by the more famous linkage of 'trade and envi-
ronment'. 'Trade and health' issues have often been subsumed in the 'trade and en-
vironment' discourse,7 but the 'trade and health' linkage should be separated from its
more well-known relative. In many ways, 'trade and health' is the oldest linkage be-
international cooperation is critical).
'DavidP. Fidler, The Globalization of Public Health: Emerging Infectious Diseases and In-
ternational Relations, IndianaJournal of Global Legal Studies, vol. 5, 1997, 11, 12. The concept
of the 'globalization of public health' is not original to me as the recognition of the breakdown
in the distinction between national and international public health indicates. See sources cited
supra (note 1).
' See infra Part I.A.
'See infra Part I.B. Hiroshi Nakajima, Message from the Director-General, in: World Health
Organization, The World Health Report 1997: Conquering Suffering, Enriching Humanity,
1997, v ("In the battle for health in the 21' century, infectious diseases and chronic diseases are
twin enemies that have to be fought simultaneously on a global scale.").
6 World Health Organization, Obesity Epidemic Puts Millions at Risk from Related Dis-
eases, WHO Press Release WHO/46, 12 June 1997.
' See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty/Damien Geradin, Market Access, Competitiveness, and Harmo-
nization: Environmental Protection in Regional Trade Agreements, Harvard Environmental
Law Review, vol. 21, 1997,265; and ThomasJ. Scboenbaum, International Trade and Protection
of the Environment: The Continuing Search for Reconciliation, American Journal of
International Law, vol. 91, 1997, 268.
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cause it originates in the mid-nineteenth century.! It, thus, pre-dates by over a
century the 'trade and environment' controversy of the last fifteen years. The trade-
health linkage has, over the course of a century and a half, had an impact on more
than international trade law, as evidenced by the development of International
Health Regulations (IHR), which are administered by the WHO.9 The dynamics of
this linkage can be analyzed through two different areas of international law: inter-
national health law, represented by the IHR and its historical antecedents, and inter-
national trade law, represented by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and
its evolution into the World Trade Organization (WTO). In addition, the current
WHO proposals to develop an international framework convention on tobacco regu-
lation promises to showcase the trade-health linkage in a brand new area of inter-
national health law. 10
In analyzing the different ways that international health law and international
trade law have handled the trade-health linkage, we can identify the special dynamics
of this linkage. At its heart, the dynamics derive energy and friction from the tension
between two objectives: (1) the protection of public health through the exercise of
sovereignty, which I refer to as 'public health sovereignty'; and (2) the promotion of
trade through the limitations on the exercise of public health sovereignty. Since the
mid-nineteenth century, the story of the linkage has been the repeated attempts by
States to strike a balance between public health sovereignty and trade disciplines on
the exercise of such sovereignty. The great protagonist of this story is science because
States have repeatedly turned to science to provide the guidance needed to balance
health and trade interests. But the story does not end with science slaying the twin
dragons of trade-damaging sovereignty and health-wrecking trade. Recent episodes
including the saga of 'mad cow' disease in the European Community (EC),1" the
WTO panel decision in the BeefHormones Case (Hormones Panel Report)" and the
WTO Appellate Body's decision on this case (Hormones Appellate Report), 3 and the
8 See infra Part 11.
'World Health Organization, International Health Regulations, 3rd ed., 1983 [hereinafter
Int'l Health Reg.].
,oSee infra Part I.B.
1See Case C-180/96R, United Kingdom v. Commission, [1996] 3 CMLR 1 (European Court
of Justice rejecting Britain's application for the annulment of the EC Commission's decision
imposing a worldwide ban on the export of British beef and beef products).
12 ECMeasures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), issued 18 August 1997, WTO
Doc. No. WTO/DS26/R/USA [hereinafter Hormones Panel Report]. Canada brought a simi-
lar case against the EC. See ECMeasures ConcerningMeat and Meat Products (Hormones), issued
18 August 1997, WTO Doc. No. WT/DS48/R/CAN.
"3 EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), issued 16 January 1998,
WTO Doc. No. WT/DS26/AB/R and WT/DS48/AB/R [hereinafter Hormones Appellate
Report].
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new United States policy to improve the food safety of imported food products"
suggest that the trade-health linkage has a future as controversial as its past.
In this article, I explore in depth the 'trade and health' linkage in five steps. First,
I examine the globalization of public health by providing some background to the
global health crises of emerging infectious diseases and tobacco-related diseases."
Second, I provide a historical perspective on the trade-health linkage by exploring the
development of this linkage since its first explicit recognition in international
diplomacy in the mid-nineteenth century. Third, I explore the dynamics of the trade-
health linkage in the areas of international health law and international trade law and
show the development in both areas of what I call the 'science paradigm'. Fourth, I
discuss the concerns that currently exist about the science paradigm in international
health and trade law. Finally, I speculate on the future of the trade-health linkage in
both international health law and international trade law and offer some suggestions
for improving how the linkage will be handled in the future.
I. The Globalization of Public Health:
Global Health Crises in Infectious and Tobacco-Related Diseases
Two great threats cloud the future of global health: the crisis in emerging infec-
tious diseases and the crisis in non-communicable diseases caused by tobacco con-
sumption. The WHO has recognized both of these crises as world health priorities
that require international cooperation and action. National governments, particularly
in the United States and Western Europe, also recognize the threats posed by
emerging infectious diseases and tobacco-related illnesses. In Part I, I explore each of
these public health crises briefly and analyze them as progeny of the globalization of
public health.
1. Emerging Infectious Diseases
International and national public health agencies define 'emerging infectious dis-
eases' (ElDs) as "diseases of infectious origin whose incidence in humans has increased
within the past two decades or threatens to increase in the near future." 6 This defini-
4James Bennet, President Wants F.D.A. to Regulate Foreign Produce, N.Y. Times, 3 Octo-
ber 1997, Al (reporting on new Clinton administration policy on improving quality of food
imports into the United States). The news story that prompted the Clinton administration to
launch this initiative appeared a few days earlier in the New York Times. See Jeff Gerth/Tim
Weiner, Imports Swamp U.S. Food-Safety Efforts, N.Y. Times, 29 September 1997, Al and A8.
Including the emerging global obesity crisis is beyond the scope of this article.
16 CDC Strategy (note 1), 1; and World Health Organization, World Health Report 1996:
Fighting Disease, Fostering Development, 1996, 15 [hereinafter World Health Rep. 1996].
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tion encompasses both new diseases that humans had never identified before, like
HIV/AIDS and Ebola hemorrhagic fever, as well as old diseases familiar to humans
but now re-emerging as health threats, such as tuberculosis and malaria. 7
International and national public health officials have identified EDs as one of the
most serious global health threats confronting humanity in the late twentieth centu-
ry. According to the WHO, infectious diseases are the world's leading cause of death,
killing at least 17 million people - most of them young children - every year."8 Up
to half the 5,720 million people on earth are at risk of many endemic infectious dis-
eases.' 9 The WHO has called the emergence and re-emergence of infectious diseases a
global crisis that requires global cooperation.20 Key public health and medical agen-
cies and institutes in the United States have identified EIDs as an international threat
to American public health.2' Global actions plans are being developed to deal with
the ED crisis that involve international and national efforts.22
The reasons why the world confronts an EID crisis are complex, and elsewhere
they are explored more thoroughly.23 Central to many of the factors behind the
emergence and re-emergence of infectious diseases are the processes of globalization:
Infectious diseases spread through the links created by an interdependent world. Globaliza-
tion provides infectious diseases with opportunities to infect human populations across the
planet almost as easily as infecting the family next door. Just as companies today create glo-
bal strategies, public health authorities must view the health of their citizens from a global
24perspective.
A key aspect of globalization that helps pathogenic microbes spread is international
trade, particularly trade in food and food products. The United States Institute of
Medicine has observed that "[i]nternational trade has become so pervasive that it is
'" A United States interagency governmental working group identified the emergence of 29
new diseases and the re-emergence of 20 older diseases since 1973. CISET Rep. (note 2), 14 - 15.
iS World Health Rep. 1996 (note 16), 1.
19 Id.
20 Id., 105; World Health Organization, Communicable Disease Prevention and Control:
New, Emerging, and Re-Emerging Infectious Diseases - Report by the Director-General,
WHO Doc. A48/15, 22 February 1995, 2.
21 CDC Strategy (note 1); Institute of Medicine, Emerging Infections: Microbial Threats to
Health in the United States, 1992 [hereinafter IOM Rep.]; CISET Rep. (note 2).
' For a detailed analysis of proposed global action plans, see David P. Fidler, Return of the
Fourth Horseman: Emerging Infectious Diseases and International Law, Minnesota Law Re-
view, vol. 81, 1997, 771, 819 - 832.
23 Id., 785 - 800 (analyzing factors behind ElIDs). See also CDC Strategy (note 1), 7 (listing
factors behind EIDs); IOM Rep. (note 21), 34 - 112 (discussing factors behind EIDs); and
CISET Rep. (note 2), 10 (discussing factors behind EIDs).
24 Fidler (note 22), 774 - 775.
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virtually impossible to screen most of the food entering the country for known mi-
crobial hazards, let alone for new microbial threats."" Up to seventy percent of fruits
and vegetables consumed in some U.S. states today is imported from the developing
world." It is precisely this threat from pathogenic microbes hitchhiking on world
food and food products trade that stimulated the Clinton administration in early
October 1997 to launch a policy initiative to improve the safety of food imported
into the United States. 27
2. The Global Tobacco Pandemic
National and international public health officials have long considered smoking
and other forms of tobacco consumption to be very hazardous to human health.
Smoking kills by causing "heart disease, stroke, chronic bronchitis, emphysema, and
cancer, especially lung cancer. "2 American anti-tobacco efforts began in the mid-
1960s after release of the first U.S. Surgeon General's report on the adverse health
consequences of smoking.29 The WHO has, since 1970, been active in advocating that
its member States undertake anti-tobacco campaigns.30 Such longstanding WHO
involvement in this issue suggests that tobacco consumption has long been an inter-
national public health concern. The global circumstances of tobacco consumption
have, however, changed dramatically since 1970, which has caused the WHO to
launch a new effort to deal with the impending global tobacco pandemic.
" IOM Rep. (note 21), 68.
26 Emerging Infections: A Significant Threat to the Nation's Health: Hearings Before the
Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 104th Cong. 1, 1995, 44 (statement of Dr.
Michael Osterholm).
See Bennet (note 14), Al.
28 World Health Organization, Tobacco: A Global Emergency, Tobacco Control, vol. 4,
1995, 297, 297. Infectious diseases and tobacco-related diseases may develop connections, espe-
cially in developing countries. Lown writes that "[tihere is evidence that tobacco may interact
synergistically with infectious diseases and with environmental hazards to cause increases in
certain cancers." BernardLown, The Opium Wars of the 21' Century: Tobacco and the Devel-
oping World, available at SatelLife Homepage, available at < http:www.healthnet.org. pro-
grams/procor. 9710comm.html >. For detailed information on the link between tobacco con-
sumption and chronic diseases, see World Health Organization, The World Health Report
1997: Conquering Suffering, Enriching Humanity, 1997.
29 RonaSM. Davis, Tobacco Policy Research Comes of Age, Tobacco Control, vol. 4, 1995,
6,6.
3 Allyn L. Taylor, An International Regulatory Strategy for Global Tobacco Control, Yale
Journal of International Law, vol. 21, 1996, 257, 279 -280 (noting WHO's anti-tobacco efforts
since 1970).
20 GYIL 40
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In the recent past, tobacco consumption was a priority public health concern in
developed countries, where "[c]igarette smoking.., is one of the largest causes of
preventable death worldwide and is the leading cause of premature death in devel-
oped countries."3 Successful anti-smoking campaigns in developed countries have,
however, forced declines in demand for tobacco products. The giant tobacco conglo-
merates, which are mainly American or British,32 have turned their attention away
from developed countries towards "developing and expanding new markets in Africa,
Asia, Latin America, Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union, where tobacco
regulation is limited."33 As Lown put it, "[t]he struggle against tobacco is not being
won, it is being relocated."34 Tobacco exports play a key role in entering new emerg-
ing tobacco markets. Both the tobacco conglomerates and the governments of devel-
oped countries have vigorously supported tobacco exports to the developing world,
often employing national trade law weapons, such as Section 301 of the U.S. Trade
Act of 19 7 4,3s and international trade law in the form of the GATT to open markets
for their tobacco exports.36 Western tobacco conglomerates have hit the jackpot with
these private and government-supported efforts:
The evidence of this success is staggering. Worldwide cigarette consumption has increased
75 % in the last few decades. American cigarette exports alone have more than trebled in the
31 Id., 260 - 261. The WHO reports that research estimates show just how devastating the
tobacco epidemic in developed countries has been over the last half of the 20 th century.
Between 1950 and 2000, about 62 million people will have died in these countries from tobacco
use, most (52 million) of these men, with the majority (38 million) dying in middle age (35 - 69
years). On average those killed by tobacco in this age group lose more than 20 years of life
expectancy. World Health Organization, Mortality from Smoking in Developed Countries,
1950 -2000, Tobacco Control, vol. 4, 1995, 102, 102.
32 Taylor (note 30), 262.
"Id. See also Lown (note 28) (the tobacco industry's long range global strategy is to maintain
sales roughly constant in industrialized countries, while investing mammoth resources to
increase market share in the Third World, in the former Soviet Union and in Eastern
Europe.").
Lown (note 28).
For analysis of U.S. government efforts to support American tobacco exports, see United
States General Accounting Office, Trade and Health Issues: Dichotomy Between U.S. Tobacco
Export Policy and Antismoking Initiatives, GAO/NSIAD-90-190, May 1990; Paula C. Johnson,
Regulation, Remedy, and Exported Tobacco Products: The Need for a Response from the
United States Government, Suffolk University Law Review, vol. 25, 1991, 1; Heidi S. Gruner,
The Export of U.S. Tobacco Products to Developing Countries and Previously Closed Mar-
kets, Law & Policy in International Business, vol. 28, 1996, 217; and Susan M. Marsh, U.S. To-
bacco Exports: Toward Monitoring and Regulation Consistent with Acknowledged Health
Risks, Wisconsin International Law Journal, vol. 15, 1996, 29.
36 See Thailand -Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, adopted 7
November 1990, Basic Instruments Selected Documents, 37"' Supp., 1990, 200 [hereinafter Thai
Cigarette Case].
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last ten years. In this decade, tobacco consumption is expected to fall by 17 % in developed
countries and to rise by 12 % in developing countries and Eastern Europe.
37
The public health consequences of this shift in global tobacco consumption pat-
terns are grim. Taylor captures the scenario unfolding:
The enormous growth in smoking throughout the world in recent years has increased the
global risk of tobacco related diseases at an alarming rate.... The already high prevalence
of smoking in developing countries is likely to rise further as economic development makes
tobacco more affordable. WHO predicts that if the current trend in developing countries
persists over the next thirty years, seven million inhabitants of developing countries will die
annually from smoking related diseases, accounting for 70 % of tobacco related deaths
worldwide. Hence, within the next thirty years, smoking will be not only the leading cause
of premature mortality in developed states, but also the leading cause of premature death
worldwide.
38
The looming global public health catastrophe of tobacco-related diseases has fueled
renewed efforts at the WHO to address tobacco consumption. In May 1995, the
World Health Assembly asked the Director-General to report to it on the feasibility
of developing a treaty on international tobacco control. 9 In November 1995, thb
Director-General delivered his report in which various options for an international
instrument on tobacco control were discussed.4" International legal analysis and advo-
cacy, led by Dr. Allyn Taylor, gave the idea of an international treaty on tobacco con-
trol more substance and momentum.41 In May 1996, the World Health Assembly
instructed the Director-General to begin developing a framework convention on in-
ternational tobacco control.42 At the 1 0 th World Conference on Tobacco or Health
held in August 1997, the WHO Director-General vividly described the global tobac-
co pandemic as "a fire in the global village"43 and urged WHO member States to "sup-
1 Taylor (note 30), 266.
381 Id., 267 -268. See also Christopherj. L. Murray/Alan D. Lopez (eds.), The Global Burden of
Disease: Summary, 1996, 38 ("By 2020, the burden of disease attributable from tobacco is
expected to outweigh that caused by any single disease.... This is a global health emergency
that many governments have yet to confront.").
"' World Health Assembly, An International Strategy for Tobacco Control, WHA Res.
WHA48.11, 48 h Ass., 12th Plen. Mtg., 12 May 1995.
40 World Health Organization, The Feasibility of Developing an International Instrument
for Tobacco Control: Report by the Director-General, WHO Doc. EB97/INF.DOC./4, 30
November 1995.
41 See Allyn L. Taylor/Ruth Roemer, International Strategy for Tobacco Control, WHO/
PSA/96.6, 1996; Taylor (note 30).
42 World Health Assembly, International Framework Convention for Tobacco Control,
WHA Res. 49.17, 49'h Ass., 6 'h Plen. Mtg., WHO Doc. A49/VR/6, 26 May 1996.
" World Health Organization, The Smoking Epidemic - "A Fire in the Global Village",
WHO Press Release WHO/61, 25 August 1997.
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port transforming WHO's recommendations for comprehensive tobacco control into
international law."
44
The global tobacco pandemic is also, like the EID crisis, the progeny of globaliza-
tion because of the critical importance of international trade in the spreading of to-
bacco consumption. The transnational tobacco companies view the world as a single,
global market; and the existence of borders and sovereignty seems not to constitute
much of an obstacle to their strategies. Globalization is forcing States interested in
controlling the tobacco threat to their populations to realize the need for interna-
tional cooperation:
The tobacco pandemic vividly demonstrates the ever increasing interdependence of national
efforts to protect public health. This global health challenge is international in origin, has
international repercussions, and necessitates collaborative, multilateral action to encourage
and assist countries in the development and implementation of effective national and inter-
national action.
45
3. The Globalization of Public Health: Health v. Trade?
This overview of the infectious disease and tobacco-related disease crises could easi-
ly lead one to conclude that the contemporary architecture of international trade is
dangerous to human health. The growth in the volumes of international food and
tobacco trade - the conduits for diseases - flows from the opportunities opened by
international trade law. The health dangers of international trade could be augmented
by noting the severe pressures global economic competition places on governments,
which are forced to be austere in, among many areas, their public health and health
care budgets.46 States, thus, face great public health problems with inadequate re-
sources and commitment. The danger is especially obvious in the developing world.
The great burden of EIDs will fall primarily on the developing world,47 as will the
future health disaster caused by tobacco consumption.4" Those most vulnerable to the
health threats posed by globalization are those most unable to protect themselves
from such threats and the international trade forces that exacerbate them. These
44 Id.
'5 Taylor (note 30), 278.
46 David P. Fidler, Globalization, International Law, and Emerging Infectious Diseases,
Emerging Infectious Diseases, vol. 2, 1996, 77, 78 (noting that "the development of the global
market has intensified economic competition and increased pressure on governments to reduce
expenditures, including the funding of public health programs, leaving states increasingly un-
prepared to deal with emerging disease problems.").
4' World Health Rep. 1996 (note 16), 9.
48 See Taylor (note 30), 267 - 268 (providing statistics on the future burden of tobacco-related
diseases for developing countries).
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conclusions seem to point to a Faustian bargain at work for States in the globaliza-
tion of public health: support international trade and its modern rules and institu-
tions and lose the ability to protect public health.
Such simplistic conclusions are misleading descriptively and normatively. The
trade-health linkage is not, and never has been, an avoidable Faustian deal. It arises
from the structure of the international system and the nature of human diseases. His-
torically, States have developed ways to try to strike an appropriate balance between
trade interests and health objectives that cannot be dismissed without some objective
analysis. These developments do not necessarily mean that the perfect balance has
been struck in any historical moment, but the on-going process reveals a complicated
and necessary balancing act taking place on a global scale. Normatively, seeing the
trade-health linkage as a zero-sum game contains an archaic (and chaotic) vision for
the future: we restrict international trade to accommodate national health. States set
out to refine this type of thinking approximately 150 years ago in order that health-
based restrictions on international trade had a rational basis grounded in science.
While fraught with many difficulties, as this article will explore, this science-con-
nected approach makes progress away from the 'trade v. health' mentality to one that
sees, and works to develop further, trade and health as permanently intertwined
objectives in the global village.
II. The Oldest Linkage: Trade and Health in History
While the globalization of public health is the source of great angst today, few
people appreciate that it is not a new phenomenon. In fact, the globalization of pub-
lic health is perhaps one of the oldest aspects of globalization. The link between trade
and health is ancient, as trade and travel have been the major sources for spreading
diseases since the dawn of human civilizations.49 Diamond observes that a bonanza
for infectious diseases "was the development of world trade routes, which by Roman
times effectively joined the populations of Europe, Asia, and North Africa into one
giant breeding ground for microbes." 0 The conscious linking of trade and health is
also very old, dating back to at least the fourteenth century when Italian city-states
began to develop quarantine systems as measures against the importation of the dis-
ease that became known as the 'Black Death' - bubonic plague."' Although without
any clue about how bubonic plague was transmitted or how it infected humans, the
leaders of late fourteenth Italian city-states had the belief that the Black Death came
49 See generally William H. McNeill, Plagues and Peoples, 1976, for a study of the importance
of diseases in the development of human societies.
"°Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fate of Human Societies, 1997, 205.
" Neville Goodman, International Health Organizations and Their Work, 2nd ed., 1971, 29.
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to them through trade. 2 By the nineteenth century, most European States had imple-
mented quarantine systems based on the linkage between trade and health."
International cooperation on the trade-health problem did not appear until the
mid-nineteenth century. National quarantine systems still dominated the European
approach to the trade-health relationship in the first half of the nineteenth century,
but changes in the nature of international trade forced States to confront the inade-
quacy of national quarantine. National quarantine systems had long been a burden
on international commerce because they often subjected ships, cargo, and crew to
measures and treatment that were not only economically wasteful but also "cruel to
the point of barbarity." 4 As international trade began to increase in both volume and
speed in the first half of the nineteenth century, the ramshackle collection of national
quarantine systems in Europe began to impose, especially for the British, an almost
intolerable cost on international trade.5 These rising frustrations with national
quarantine were peaking simultaneously with the early cholera epidemics in Europe,
which caused great death and fear across Europe. 6 Quarantine systems had not pro-
tected European populations from the ravages of cholera, so their value to national
health was questioned. 7
Both the trade and health concerns of European nations surrounding quarantine
led directly to the convening in 1851 of the first international sanitary conference.58
This conference represents the recognition by European States that they could not
deal with disease threats moving through international trade without formal interna-
tional cooperation. We see in this conference the first recognition of the phenome-
non of the globalization of public health. 9 The negotiations in 1851 on an interna-
tional convention to harmonize national quarantine regulations also constitute the
first multilateral cooperation on the trade-health linkage in history.
12 Id., 31.
53 Id.
54 Id., 34.
5' Norman Howard-Jones, The Scientific Background of the International Sanitary Confer-
ences 1851 - 1938, 1975, 11 (noting that "what governments found most irksome were the often
disastrous hindrances to international commerce, and it was this concern that finally prompted
the European nations to meet to discuss to what extent these onerous restrictions could be
lifted without undue risk to the health of their populations.").
56 Goodman (note 51), 38 (discussing early European epidemics of cholera, "a new and
terrifying disease to the western world").
571 Id. (noting that quarantines seemed impotent to stop spread of cholera in Europe).
" For a description of the first international sanitary conference, see Howard-Jones (note 55),
12- 16.
5' For more on the 19 ,h century emergence of the globalization of public health, see Fidler
(note 3), 24 - 25.
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The trade-health linkage proved so strong and compelling in the latter half of the
nineteenth century that European States, with occasional participation by the Otto-
man Empire and later the United States, convened no less than ten international
sanitary conferences to try to create international conventions to balance national
health protection and international trade interests.60 For the most part, these inter-
national sanitary conferences failed to make progress until the early 1890s, by which
time scientists such as Louis Pasteur and Robert Koch had demonstrated that the 'germ
theory' of diseases was the correct theory." In other words, little headway was made
in balancing trade and human health objectives until science had developed suffi-
ciently to provide a more accurate understanding of infectious diseases.62 The scien-
tific breakthroughs created the conditions that produced four international sanitary
conventions in the 1890s - the first international legal instruments and rules created
in nearly fifty years of international sanitary conferences.63
Not only had science broken the diplomatic impasse in the trade-health problem
but it also began to re-orient national policies on public health protection. It became
more and more apparent that quarantine systems, as traditionally organized, had
little effect on preventing the importation of infectious diseases. Science pointed to
the need for surveillance and public health policies driven by the epidemiological
nature of the pathogen in question. Wonderfully, the scientifically-based measures
needed to protect public health better resulted in fewer and less onerous restrictions
on international trade. The international sanitary conventions of the first half of the
60 These ten international sanitary conferences were held in Paris (1851), Paris (1859), Con-
stantinople (1866), Vienna (1874), Washington, D.C. (1881), Rome (1885), Venice (1892), Dres-
den (1893), Paris (1894), and Venice (1897). For descriptions of all these conferences, see
Howard-Jones (note 55), 12 - 80.
"The scientific work of Pasteur and Koch is described for general audiences in Paul de Kruif,
Microbe Hunters, 1926, 54 - 177.
62 In 1878, Austria, France, Germany, Portugal, and Switzerland concluded a treaty to pro-
tect plant life and health that sought to reduce the threat to wine vineyards from a plant louse.
See Convention Respecting Measures to be Taken Against Phylloxera Vasterix, 17 September
1878, 153 Consolidated Treaty Series 247. Charnovitz claims that this agreement is the "earliest
treaty to use trade measures for a health/environment purpose." Steve Charnovitz, Trade
Measures and the Design of International Regimes, Journal of Environment & Development,
vol. 5, 1996, 168, 176.
63 International Sanitary Convention of 1892, 30 January 1892, 1893 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 8
(dealing with cholera and west-bound shipping from the East); International Sanitary Con-
vention of 1893, 15 April 1893, 1894 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 4 (addressing quarantine measures for
cholera); International Sanitary Convention of 1894, 3 April 1894, 1899 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 8
(on cholera and the Mecca pilgrimages); and the International Sanitary Convention of 1897,
184 Consolidated Treaty Series 264 (on plague).
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twentieth century attempted to harmonize national public health measures on disease
importation in a way that served both health and trade.64
The trade-health synergy made possible by scientific progress can be seen clearly
in the fundamental objective of the WHO's International Health Regulations (IHR),
originally adopted in 1951. The IHR consolidated and updated the rules in the vari-
ous international sanitary conventions of the pre-World War II period with the ob-
jective of providing the maximum protection against the international spread of
disease with minimum interference with world traffic.6" This fundamental objective
continues to drive the IHR today as the WHO prepares to revise it to deal with the
EID crisis.66
The IHR were not the only international legal rules to recognize the trade-health
linkage immediately after World War H. The General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT), the first great multilateral trade agreement, recognized the trade-
health link in 1947 by allowing contracting parties to derogate from GATT obliga-
tions if such derogation was necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or
health and was not applied in a way that constituted unjustified discrimination or a
disguised restriction on international trade.67 The spirit of this GATT provision
64 The major international sanitary conventions of the first half of the twentieth century
were the International Sanitary Convention of 1903, 3 December 1903, 1 Bevans 359; the Pan-
American Sanitary Convention of 1905, 14 October 1905, 1 Bevans 450; the International Sani-
tary Convention of 1912, 17 January 1912, 4 LNTS 282; the Pan-American Sanitary Code of
1924, 14 November 1924, 86 LNTS 43; the International Sanitary Convention of 1926, 21 June
1926, 78 LNTS 229; and the International Sanitary Convention for Aerial Navigation of 1933,
12 April 1933, 161 LNTS 65. The International Office of Epizootics was also founded during
this period, in 1924, to address sanitary measures relating to the export and import of animals
and animal products. International Agreement for the Creation of an International Office of
Epizootics, 25 January 1924, 57 LNTS 135.
's Int'l Health Reg. (note 9), 5.
Fidler (note 22), 851 (noting that WHO continues to embrace this fundamental objective
as it revises the IHR).
67 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 30 October 1947, 55 UNTS 187, as amended by
the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotia-
tions, 15 April 1994, 33 ILM 1125 (1994) [hereinafter GATT], Art. XX(b). The trade-health
link appeared earlier in international trade law than GATT. See, e.g., the 1878 Convention Re-
specting Measures to be Taken Against Phylloxera Vasterix (note 62). Charnovitz has also iden-
tified a number of treaties concluded in the first half of the 2 0 h century that directly address
the trade-health linkage. See Charnovitz (note 62), 78 - 79 (describing five treaties that employed
trade measures for health purposes); Steve Charnovitz, Green Roots, Bad Pruning: GATT
Rules and Their Application to Environmental Trade Measures, Tulane Environmental Law
Journal, vol. 7, 1994, 299, 327 fn. 150 (describing 1929 plant protection treaty). These six
treaties were: the Convention Relating to Liquor Traffic in Africa, 10 September 1919, 8
LNTS 11; Convention to Safeguard Livestock Interests by Prevention of Infectious and Conta-
gious Diseases, 16 March 1928, Mexico-United States, 106 LNTS 481; International Conven-
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echoes the fundamental goal of the IHR: to balance health and trade requirements of
States in the international system. As explored in more detail in Part III, how the
GATT system strikes the balance has undergone some radical refinement.
Notably absent from the preceding analysis has been any mention of tobacco.
Tobacco does not figure in the trade-health linkage until well after World War 11.68
Infectious diseases dominate the linkage from its first appearances in late fourteenth
century Italian city-states. Two points should, however, be noted. First, tobacco has
been actively traded internationally since its first cultivation by Europeans in the
Americas.69 Thus, the tobacco-international trade connection is very old. Second, the
GATT framework established in 1947, and refined thereafter, applies to trade in
many products, including tobacco.'0 The tobacco-international trade law connection
has, at least implicitly, been around since the founding of GATT. These two observa-
tions combine to show that the conditions have been ripe for many years for tobacco
to figure more prominently in the trade-health linkage. What was missing was the
scientific evidence that tobacco consumption caused human diseases. Just as science
launched international health law in the late nineteenth century, scientific advance-
ment would propel tobacco to the forefront of the trade-health linkage in the latter
half of the twentieth century.71
tion for the Protection of Plants, 16 April 1929, 126 LNTS 305; International Convention for
the Campaign Against Contagious Diseases in Animals, 20 February 1935, 186 LNTS 173; In-
ternational Convention Concerning the Transit of Animals, Meat, and Other Products of Ani-
mal Origin, 20 February 1935, 193 LNTS 37; and International Convention Concerning the
Export and Import of Animal Products (Other than Meat, Meat Preparations, Fresh Animal
Products, Milk, and Milk Products), 20 February 1935, 193 LNTS 59.
6 The connection between tobacco imports and health was not lost on King James 1 of Eng-
land, who was so alarmed by the increasing use of tobacco that he published in 1604 "A
Counterblaste to Tobacco", in which he criticized smoking as "A custome lothsome to the eye,
hatefull to the Nose, harmefull to the braine, [and] dangerous to the Lungs." Quoted in Mark
S. Gold, Tobacco, 1995, 19. The English poet Swinburne also expressed an appreciation of the
tobacco-health connection by remarking that King James was a bad king "but I love him, I
worship him, because he slit the throat of that blackguard [Sir Walter] Raleigh, who invented
this filthy smoking." Quoted in Victor G. Kiernan, Tobacco: A History, 1991, 15. Raleigh did
not invent smoking, but he played an instrumental role in bringing tobacco consumption from
the New World - where indigenous peoples had long smoked tobacco (id., 8 - 12) - to the
Old World. Id., 12 ("Raleigh is agreed to have been the first to bring smoking into fashion" in
England).
69 "Tobacco was, in fact, the first export from the New World, thus launching the economic
juggernaut that has, to this day, continued almost unchallenged." Gold (note 68), 18.
0 See, e.g., Thai Cigarette Case (note 36); and United States -Measures Affecting the Importa-
tion, Internal Sale and Use of Tobacco, adopted 4 October 1994, GATT Doc. No. DS44/R
(concerning U.S. measures on tobacco imports but not addressing public health concerns about
tobacco consumption).
"1 Karl Fagerstr6m et aL describe the current state of medical and scientific research on tobac-
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This brief history of the trade-health linkage demonstrates not only its consider-
able age but its continued importance across hundreds of years of human activity.
The recognition of the role of international trade in the spreading of diseases pro-
duced national regulatory action in the form of quarantine systems from the late
fourteenth to the nineteenth centuries. The growing burdens of the national quaran-
tine systems on international trade stimulated international cooperation on harmoni-
zing national quarantine measures in the mid-nineteenth century. Scientific advances
in the late nineteenth century created the necessary conditions for the development
of the first rules of international law regulating the trade-health relationship. After
World War Il, at the dawn of a new international order, the trade-health linkage was
embedded in two important realms of international law: international health law
(IHR) and international trade law (GATT).
Il. The Dynamics of the Trade-Health Linkage:
The Development of the Science Paradigm
The trade-health linkage has produced a set of dynamics in both international
health law and international trade law that emphasizes science. The basic conflict in
the trade-health linkage is between the sovereign right to protect national health and
the interests of other States in international trade. Trade-restricting national public
health measures have created international friction and have led States into inter-
national negotiations on balancing public health sovereignty and international trade.
International negotiations have tended to strike the balance by using science for
guidance because science tells us what is necessary medically to protect public health.
Trade restrictions are more acceptable when they are based on science. Science
becomes, then, the standard against which national measures are evaluated under in-
ternational law and the standard set for international harmonization of public health
measures through international law. The role of science medically and legally be-
comes institutionalized in international organizations responsible for international
health and international trade, These international organizations bear the responsibil-
ity for maintaining the integrity of the use of science in the attempts to balance pub-
lic health sovereignty and international trade. This set of dynamics I call the 'science
paradigm'. In Part III, I explore the development of the science paradigm in inter-
national health law and international trade law.
co consumption: "Tobacco smoking is no longer regarded as just a habit. The two most recent
decades of research have resulted in its classification as a drug addiction on par with other so-
called hard drugs and as a consequence, the United States Food and Drug Administration, has
proposed regulations to control the promotion, sale, and distribution of cigarettes and smoke-
less tobacco." Karl 0. Fagerstr6m et aL, Nicotine Dependence Versus Smoking Prevalence:
Comparisons Among Countries and Categories of Smokers, Tobacco Control, vol. 5, 1996,
52, 52.
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1. International Health Law and the Science Paradigm
a) Infectious Diseases
As noted in Part H, progress in the development of international health law in the
nineteenth century did not occur until science had advanced sufficiently to give
people a more accurate understanding of pathogenic microbes. Once the 'germ
theory' of diseases had been developed and accepted by the international scientific
community, international health law began to develop rapidly. One of the key as-
pects of the development of international health law was the attempt to harmonize
national quarantine measures on scientifically-based regulations. The international
sanitary conventions of the first half of the twentieth century established the maxi-
mum measures against certain infectious diseases that State parties could take.7" These
maximum measures were based on a scientific understanding of the diseases in ques-
tion. For example, the International Sanitary Convention of 1903 provides that "[n]o
merchandise is capable by itself of transmitting plague or cholera. It only becomes
dangerous when contaminated by plague or cholera products."73 Such scientific un-
derstandings of infectious diseases allowed States to harmonize national public health
measures in a way that was less restrictive of trade and more protective of public
health.
The important role science had come to play in the development of international
health law is apparent from the creation of the WHO and the IHR after World
War II. The inclusion in the WHO Constitution of powers under which the World
Health Assembly could adopt binding regulations on "sanitary and quarantine re-
quirements and other procedures designed to prevent the international spread of dis-
ease"74 was, at the time adopted, thought a great advance in international health law
because "[t]he authority to issue regulations supposedly gave the WHO the ability to
keep the IHR up-to-date regarding scientific advances without having to proceed
through the cumbersome treaty process.""5 Science is also important in explaining
two other novel features of the IHR. First, under the WHO Constitution, the IHR
and any revisions of them are binding on all WHO member States unless they 'con-
72 International Sanitary Convention of 1926 (note 64), Art. 15 ("The measures as provided
in this Chapter must be regarded as constituting a maximum within the limits of which Gov-
ernments may regulate the procedure to be applied to ships on their arrival."). See also Int'l
Health Reg. (note 9), Art. 23.
"3 International Sanitary Convention of 1903 (note 64), Art. 11. See similar provisions in the
Pan-American Sanitary Convention of 1905 (note 64), Art. XI, and the International Sanitary
Convention of 1912 (note 64), Art. 12.
" WHO Constitution, in World Health Organization, Basic Documents, 4 0 ,h ed., 1994, 1,
Art. 21 [hereinafter WHO Const.].
71 Fidler (note 22), 836.
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tract out' by notifying the Director-General within a specified period of time of their
rejection of the IHR or any revision to them.7' The scientific basis for the IHR gives
them a legitimacy that supports reversing traditional international legal practice from
'contracting in' to 'contracting out'. Second, any reservations made to the IHR or
any revisions to them have to be approved by the World Health Assembly.77 Given
the universality of scientific conclusions, the sovereign power to make reservations
to international agreements is subject to restriction in order to preserve harmoniza-
tion through scientifically-based regulations.
In the various manifestations of international health law, science allows States to
agree to scientifically-grounded restrictions on the exercise of public health sovereign-
ty. The international sanitary conventions and later the IHR created very detailed
regulatory regimes driven by the scientific requirements of preventing the spread of
certain infectious diseases. These regulations constitute the maximum measures that
governments may apply to people and products flowing in international trade. In the
IHR, the responsibility for updating the regulations as science advances rests with an
international organization, the WHO. The science paradigm clearly plays a dominant
role in the conceptualization and implementation of traditional international health
law.
b) International Tobacco Control
The science paradigm also occupies an important role in the WHO's recent efforts
to create a framework convention on international tobacco control. The impetus
behind this new initiative in international health law arises, of course, from (1) the
scientific evidence that smoking and other forms of tobacco consumption are danger-
ous to human health, and (2) the rapid growth of tobacco use in the developing
world. As in the IHR's infectious disease context, science legitimates international
cooperation and the development of international law.78 The proposed WHO frame-
work convention, it is hoped, will lead to more specific protocols on particular regu-
latory issues, like tobacco advertising and cigarette warning labels.79 Science provides
the basis for these anticipated efforts at harmonizing tobacco regulatory regimes in
WHO member States."0 The role of science and the need for science-based harmo-
7 6 WHO Const. (note 74), Art. 22.
7 Int'l Health Reg. (note 9), Art. 88(1).
" Taylor/Roemer (note 41), ii ("An international instrument for tobacco control is justified
by an incontrovertible science base demonstrating that tobacco use is the largest single cause of
preventable, premature death and disease.").
79Taylor (note 30), 294 - 299 (discussing the framework-protocol approach to the tobacco
pandemic).8 Id., 286 (noting that "tobacco control shares the characteristic of 'scientific certainty' that
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nization of national tobacco regulations will be institutionalized in the framework-
protocol regime, which will provide WHO member States with an on-going forum
for refining and shaping international tobacco control efforts."1 Thus, the features
that mark traditional international health law on infectious diseases are appearing as
well in nascent form in the international strategy on tobacco regulation.
2. International Trade Law and the Science Paradigm
The science paradigm also comes to dominate international trade law on sanitary
and phytosanitary measures (SPS measures), but it was not dominant in the first few
decades of GATT. As noted in Part H1, GATT Article XX(b) allows contracting par-
ties to impose SPS measures if such measures are necessary and do not constitute un-
justified discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade. This GATT
provision makes no explicit mention of science, but Charnovitz argues that GATT
preparatory documents suggest that 'necessary' meant "'necessary' in a scientific
sense." 2 In the Uruguay Round, GATT contracting parties agreed to place science at
the center of the new regime for SPS measures - the Agreement on the Application
of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement).3 In this Part 111.2, I discuss
(a) the history of Article XX(b) in GATT, and (b) the place of science in the SPS
Agreement. This analysis will demonstrate the rise of the science paradigm in
international trade law.
a) A Short History of Article XX(b)
Article XX(b) represents a balancing of public health sovereignty and trade:
GATT contracting parties are allowed to derogate from the GATT rules, such as the
prohibition on quantitative restrictions on imports, 4 for public health reasons, as
long as the SPS measures applied satisfy certain disciplines. Article XX(b) applies
three disciplines to SPS measures: the SPS measure must (1) be 'necessary' to protect
animal, plant, or human life or health;"5 (2) not be an unjustified discrimination on
has galvinized international action in some realms of environmental law, including acid rain
and the ozone layer.").
"1 Id., 295 ("The success of other international organizations in using periodic meetings of
contracting parties to forge international consensus indicates that this process should be in-
cluded as a basic provision of an international convention on tobacco control.").
82 Charnovitz (note 67), 326.
83 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 15 December
1993, MTN/FA Il-A1A-4, 1994.
4 GATT (note 67), Art. XI.
85 Id., Art. XX(b).
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international trade;"6 and (3) not be a disguised restriction on international trade.87
Only the necessary requirement is specific to SPS measures because the other two
trade disciplines apply to all exceptions contained in Article XX of GATT.
The first thing to note about Article XX(b) of GATT is that it does not, like the
IHR, attempt to harmonize national SPS measures through international rules.
GATT contracting parties can enact whatever SPS measures they desire as long as
they meet the necessary requirement and are applied in a way that does not violate
the most-favored-nation treatment principle (i.e., the 'unjustified discrimination' rule)
or the national treatment principle (i.e., the 'disguised discrimination' rule). The
central question becomes, then, what does 'necessary' mean in Article XX(b). This is
the question that has generated the controversy in the history of Article XX(b).
aa) GATT Controversies Not Referred to Dispute Resolution Panels
GATT documents reveal a number of controversies over contracting parties ap-
pealing to Article XX(b) that, for whatever reasons, never went to a dispute resolu-
tion panel.8 A key feature of a number of these disputes is the complaint that the
SPS measures in question had no scientific or public health basis. Contracting parties
brought complaints to the GATT Council about the application of SPS measures by
other contracting parties and cited statements or resolutions of the WHO that the
measures being applied had no public health justification. 9 In other words, the SPS
86 Id., Art. XX (chapeau).
87 Id.
89 Eliza Patterson, International Efforts to Minimize Adverse Trade Effects of National Sani-
tary and Phytosanitary Regulations, Journal of World Trade, vol. 24, 1990, 91, 93 - 94.
9 In complaining about the EC's import ban imposed after the nuclear accident at Cherno-
byl, Hungary supported its argument that the EC's ban was arbitrary and unjustified by noting
the WHO's recommendation "according to which there was no public health justification to
ban imports from East European countries." European Economic Community - Suspension
of Food Imports from Certain East European Countries, in GATT Doc. No. C/M/198, para.
14, 29. Peru also complained about the unjustified measures other countries took against its
exports after it suffered a cholera epidemic in 1991. See Restrictions on Exports from Peru Fol-
lowing the Cholera Epidemic, GATT Doc. No. C/M/248, para. 12, 29 (Peruvian representa-
tive arguing that restrictions on Peruvian exports violated, interalia, WHO recommendations);
Restrictions on Exports from Peru Following the Cholera Epidemic, GATT Doc. No.
C/M/250, para. 18, 44 (Peruvian representative illustrating inconsistency between restrictions
on Peruvian exports and WHO conclusions that such restrictions are not justified on public
health grounds); Restrictions on Exports from Peru Following the Cholera Epidemic - Com-
munication from Peru, GATT Doc. No. L/7038, 24 June 1992 (attaching letter from Director
of the Pan American Health Organization stating that "none of the available analytical infor-
mation relating to controls imposed on food exports and/or imports showed any evidence that
the spread of cholera is related to the commercial export of food.").
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measures were not necessary to protect human, plant, or animal health or life because
they had no effect on or relevance to the health danger present. Although not the
way these episodes were handled by the GATT Council, one could read into these
controversies the requirement for a scientific basis for SPS measures as part of the
'necessary' discipline. The unsatisfactory way in which these Article XX(b) contro-
versies arose and were handled provided impetus for the development of the new
approach to SPS measures in the SPS Agreement.'
A particularly high profile controversy that never made it before a GATT panel
was the dispute between the United States and the EC over the latter's ban of meat
raised with growth hormones. A major feature of this trade dispute was the Ameri-
can claim that the EC had no scientific justification for its import ban. The United
States tried to use the then-existing Standards Code" to have a GATT Committee on
Technical Barriers to Trade establish "a Technical Expert Group to examine the
scientific judgment involved in the EC's decision to ban the importation of meat
treated with growth hormones."92 The EC was, however, successful in blocking the
formation of this Technical Expert Group and thus in shielding its import ban from
scientific scrutiny. This long-running beef hormones saga played a prominent role in
the negotiation of the SPS Agreement in the Uruguay Round.
bb) Dispute Panel Interpretations of the 'Necessary' Requirement
Two GATT panels" and one WTO panel 4 have interpreted the 'necessary' re-
quirement in Article XX(b) as part of resolving specific disputes. The interpretations
follow a consistent pattern, which could be considered the GATT jurisprudence on
Article XX(b). First, the burden is on the State invoking Article XX(b) to demon-
strate that the SPS measure in question is necessary within the meaning of GATT."5
Second, the dispute panels have asked whether the SPS measure in question falls
'Patterson (note 88), 94 (noting that "[i]n 1986, the trade ministers of GATT member coun-
tries officially recognized the need for strengthened GATT disciplines to prevent the use of
health-related measures as unjustified trade barriers and set this as a major goal of the Uruguay
Round.").
91 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, 12 April 1979, 1186 UNTS 276.
9Allen Dick, The EC Hormone Ban Dispute and the Application of the Dispute Settlement
Provisions of the Standards Code, Michigan Journal of International Law, vol. 10, 1989, 872,
877.
" See Thai Cigarette Case (note 36); and United States -Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, un-
adopted, 3 September 1991, 30 ILM 1594 (1991) [hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin Case].
9' United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, adopted 29
January 1996, WTO Doc. No. WT/DS2/R, [hereinafter U.S. Gasoline Case].
" Tuna-Dolphin Case (note 93), para. 5.22.
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"within the range of policies designed to protect human, animal or plant life or
health."9 6 Third, the panel will look to see whether the SPS measure in question is
applied in an extrajurisdictional manner. In the Tuna-Dolphin Case, the GATT panel
noted that Article XX(b) allowed each contracting party to set its own human,
animal, or plant life or health policies but that it did not allow contracting parties to
force other countries to adopt its health policies through trade restrictions.97 Fourth,
the panels have analyzed whether the SPS measure in question is 'necessary'; and the
panels have interpreted 'necessary' as follows: a SPS measure is not necessary if an
alternative measure is available that achieves the same public health objective and is
consistent with GATT obligations or is less inconsistent with such obligations.98
Thus, a SPS measure must be the least trade-restrictive measure possible to be con-
sidered 'necessary' to protect human, animal, or plant life or health under GATT.
Fifth, the SPS measure in question also must pass the 'no unjustified discrimination'
and 'no disguised restriction' on international trade disciplines.
Combining the Article XX(b) analysis from the controversies that did not go be-
fore dispute panels and from the panel decisions, we can make the following observa-
tions. First, the controversies that did not go before dispute panels suggested that the
sovereign right to enact SPS measures was not adequately balanced by the Article
XX(b) disciplines. The lack of a scientific basis for many of these measures raised the
question whether 'necessary' should be read to mean 'scientifically necessary'. Sec-
ond, the dispute panel decisions involving Article XX(b) suggest that 'necessary' also
has a trade aspect in that SPS measures have to be the least trade-restrictive measures
possible in the circumstances of the particular case. In other words, even a scientific
justification (e.g., as in Thailand's scientific justification for concern about Thai to-
bacco consumption) does not give a State complete freedom to enact whatever meas-
ure it deems fit.99 Scientifically-based SPS measures must still (1) be the least trade-
restrictive measure possible, (2) not constitute unjustifiable discrimination on interna-
tional trade, and (3) not represent a disguised restriction on international trade.
Article XX(b) could, thus, be seen to impose in theory both a science-based discipline
and trade-related disciplines on public health sovereignty.
" See Thai Cigarette Case (note 36), para. 73 (determining that import ban fell within scope
of Article XX(b)).
Tuna-Dolphin Case (note 93), para. 5.27.
b Thai Cigarette Case (note 36), para. 75 (interpreting 'necessary' requirement in Article
XX(b)); Tuna-Dolphin Case (note 93), para. 5.28 (interpreting 'necessary' requirement in Ar-
ticle XX(b)); and U.S. Gasoline Case (note 94), para. 6.24 (following the Thai cigarette panel
ruling on the interpretation of 'necessary' in Article XX(b)).
" The GATT panel in the Thai Cigarette Case ruled that the Thai import ban on American
cigarettes was not necessary because it was not the least trade-restrictive measure available. Thai
Cigarette Case (note 36), para. 81.
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b) The SPS Agreement
During the Uruguay Round, the GATT contracting parties realized the inade-
quacy of Article XX(b) in disciplining public health sovereignty by drafting the SPS
Agreement. In the SPS Agreement, we see the full flowering of the science paradigm
in international trade law.
While the SPS Agreement confirms the trade-related disciplines in Article XX(b),
it places science at the center of SPS measure policy making for WTO member States.
The SPS Agreement requires all SPS measures to be based on scientific principles and
evidence."° This provision makes explicit the implied scientific element of the
'necessary' requirement in Article XX(b). It also echoes the practice under interna-
tional health law of basing national public health measures on scientifically-sound
principles.
The SPS Agreement also follows the harmonization strategy long used in the in-
ternational health law area by requiring that WTO member States base their SPS
measures on international standards set by international organizations."' The SPS
Agreement differs from the IHR in that the harmonized standards are not the maxi-
mum measures that may be applied but are instead 'safe harbors' in which the na-
tional measures are presumed to be in conformity with GATT."°2 WTO member
States can apply SPS measures that are more stringent than international standards;
but such higher standards have to be based on scientific principles and evidence,"' as
well as survive the trade-related disciplines."
Finally, the SPS Agreement institutionalizes the role of science in international
trade law in two ways: (1) through reference to international standards created by
other international organizations, such as Codex Alimentarius; and (2) by bringing
disputes arising within the SPS Agreement under the WTO dispute settlement sys-
tem. In these two ways, the SPS Agreement institutionalizes at the international level
both the use of science in setting standards and the review of scientific justifications
for national SPS measures. As Charnovitz has observed, the SPS Agreement's
scientifically-based standards impose "new disciplines that have never before been
imposed in GATT ... disputes.""'
"0 SPS Agreement (note 83), Art. 2.2.
'o' Id., Art. 3.1.
02 Id., Art. 3.2.
"03 Id., Art. 3.3.
'o
4 Id., Art. 2.3.
"0 Steve Cbarnovitz, Free Trade, Fair Trade, Green Trade: Defogging the Debate, Cornell
International Law Journal, vol. 27, 1994, 459, 480.
21 GYIL 40
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The importance of the science paradigm in the SPS Agreement appears clearly in
the Beef Hormones Case, which contains the first WTO panel and Appellate Body
rulings to interpret the SPS Agreement.106 In this case, the WTO held that the EC's
ban on the importation of growth hormone-treated meat and meat products violated
the SPS Agreement because it was not based on scientific principles or evidence. The
EC bore the burden of demonstrating that its ban, which was stricter than the
international standards set by Codex Alimentarius for five of the six hormones in
question, was scientifically justified. 7 The WTO ruled that the import ban was put
in place without being based on a scientific risk assessment as required by the SPS
Agreement" 8 and that the scientific evidence relied on by the EC did not support an
import ban. 9
Science dominates the Beef Hormones Case. The legal findings of the panel and
Appellate Body flow from its analysis of the EC's scientific evidence for the import
ban. The EC import ban clashed fundamentally with the science paradigm in the SPS
Agreement because it was not based on scientific principles and was maintained with-
out sufficient scientific evidence."'i Without such a basis or evidence, the EC could
not maintain a measure more stringent than relevant international standards estab-
lished by the appropriate international organization. The institutionalization of
science appears in (1) the role accorded the standards set by the Codex Alimentarius
on the use of growth hormones, and (2) the interpretation of the SPS Agreement's
science provisions by the panel and Appellate Body under the WTO dispute resolu-
tion system.
"o' See Hormones Panel Report (note 12) and Hormones Appellate Report (note 13). For a
detailed critique of the Hormones Panel Report, see Steve Charnovitz, The World Trade Orga-
nization, Meat Hormones, and Food Safety, International Trade Reporter, vol. 14, 1997, 1781.
107 Hormones Panel Report (note 12), paras. 8.54 -8.55, 8.87; Hormones Appellate Report
(note 13), paras. 175 - 176.
'1 Hormones Panel Report (note 12), para. 9.1(i); Hormones Appellate Report (note 13),
para. 2530).
" Hormones Panel Report (note 12), paras. 8.124, 8.129, 8.134, and 8.139; Hormones Ap-
pellate Report (note 13), paras. 197 - 199. The Hormones Panel Report and the Hormones
Appellate Report are not identical in all respects as the latter reverses a number of important
holdings of the former. These differences are analyzed infra in Part IV.
"
0 SPS Agreement (note 83), Art. 2.2 ("Members shall ensure that any sanitary or phytosani-
tary measure is applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health, is based on scientific evidence and is not maintained without sufficient scientific
evidence.. .").
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IV. Science Rules? Concerns About the Science Paradigm
While the science paradigm prominently appears in traditional international health
law concerning infectious diseases, the new efforts to create international health law
on tobacco regulation, and international trade law on SPS measures, this prominence
has attracted some critical attention. In Part IV, I examine some of the concerns that
arise in connection with the science paradigm in the trade-health linkage.
1. Whose Science Rules?
Science is attractive in the trade-health linkage because it promises an objective
way to balance public health sovereignty and international trade interests. When irra-
tional politicians and greedy merchants fall out over the trade implications of public
health measures, we turn to the people in white lab coats to cut the Gordian policy
knot. Science in the laboratory is not, however, science in the midst of diplomacy.
The reliance on science in various areas of international law raises questions thit
erode the image of scientists as dispensing Solomonic wisdom in trade-health contro-
versies. The structure of the international system, and the importance of power in
such an anarchical structure, force us to ask questions that relate science to power. As
Atik has observed, once science leaves the laboratory and enters the world of the
diplomat, power considerations inevitably follow.'
The first science-power question is this: why appeal to science in the trade-health
linkage? The answer to this might seem obvious: science has plenty to tell us about
the human health consequences of pathogenic microbes and tobacco consumption.
The thrust behind the question, which is also implicit in the 'obvious' answer, raises
the issue of the cultural importance of science. Historically, Western, developed
States have been the champions of science and technology.' Science and its develop-
ment is intimately linked with the faith in human reason nurtured by the Enlighten-
ment. The development of the science paradigm in international legal areas consti-
tutes yet another example of the prevalence of European ideas and approaches to hu-
man problems that may not be as deeply rooted in non-European cultures.
A second science-power question confronts the direct relationship between science
and power: is it not the case that those advocating the science paradigm are also those
... Jeffrey A tik, Science and International Regulatory Convergence, Northwestern Journal
of International Law & Business, vol. 17, 1997, 736, 752 ("To assert the presence or absence of
a scientific basis for a proposition will become a political act with international significance.").
112 Robert Merton, The Sociology of Science, 1973, 267 (arguing that Western culture gives
science tremendous prominence), cited in . Alexander Tanford, The Limits of a Scientific
Jurisprudence: The Supreme Court and Psychology, Indiana Law Journal, vol. 66, 1990, 137,
151.
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that have the lion's share of trade power in the international system? Atik observes
that the world's "centers of scientific authority correspond, not accidentally, to the
major players in the world trading system.""' Science power and trade power are
linked, and science power can be used by developed countries to open more trading
opportunities for their companies through challenges to developing countries' SPS
measures. The ability to mount a successful challenge to an SPS measure under the
SPS Agreement requires certain scientific capabilities and resources that many coun-
tries might not possess. While scientific truths may apply universally (e.g., tobacco
kills without discrimination on the basis of nationality or economic status), scientific
power is not dispersed widely in the international system, which may be a cause for
concern in how the science paradigm operates.
2. Political Science? The Freezing of Science in International Organizations
A great irony of the science paradigm is that the elevation of science in the policy-
making process tends to have a chilling effect on State behavior in connection with
the trade-health linkage. In the IHR, for example, the WHO was supposed to keep
these Regulations relevant and up-to-date as scientific knowledge of infectious diseases
progressed. While some changes were made to the IMR since 1951, most notably in
the removal of typhus and smallpox from the list of diseases subject to the Regu-
lations, the IHR became more and more anachronistic in only applying to the
pestilential diseases of the past - yellow fever, cholera, and plague. The EID crisis has
revealed how ill-suited the IHR are for international infectious disease threats in the
late twentieth century. The WHO is currently preparing a revision of the IHR to
bring it up to speed with current conditions," 4 but the intervening decades since 1951
until the present reveal a reluctance on the part of the WHO member States to keep
international health law in step with scientific understandings about the international
spread of infectious diseases. In the IHR, the science paradigm was frozen because it
focused on three diseases that did not constitute the greatest threats to human health.
The IHR's rules on yellow fever, cholera, and plague are scientifically-informed; but
the political, economic, and social relevance of these three diseases in the late twen-
"
3Atik (note 111), 749.
114 For analysis of the WHO principles guiding the IHR revision effort, see Fidler (note 22),
851 - 863. For official updates on the IHR revision process see Revision of the International
Health Regulations - Progress Report, January 1998, Weekly Epidemiological Record, vol. 73,
1998, 17; Revision of the International Health Regulations - Progress Report, July 1997,
Weekly Epidemiological Record, vol. 72, 1997, 213; Revision of the International Health
Regulations - Progress Report, December 1996, Weekly Epidemiological Record, vol. 72,
1997, 9; The Revision of the International Health Regulations, Weekly Epidemiological Re-
cord, vol. 71, 1996, 233.
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tieth century exposes science's continuing vulnerability to international politics,
particularly the jealous guarding of sovereignty by States.
In the international trade law context, the defacto binding nature of international
standards, guidelines, and recommendations made by, among others, the Codex Ali-
mentarius, may produce a similar freezing of science in international organizations.
The nature of the process through which international standards - the bases for har-
monization - are set will change now that the standards will have legal significance
through the SPS Agreement. Since 1962, Codex Alimentarius has "quietly established
249 international food standards.""' After the SPS Agreement and the BeefHormones
Case, Codex Alimentarius will no longer operate quietly in obscurity. After the Hor-
mones Panel Report, the EC Farm Commissioner argued that Codex Alimentarius
is paralyzed because the WTO now relies on its decisions."6 The panel's holding
heightened the importance of international standards by interpreting the right to
adopt higher than international standards found in Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement
as an exception to the general requirement to base SPS measures on international
standards found in Article 3.1."' The Appellate Body reversed the panel on the
relationship between Articles 3.1 and 3.3, arguing that the panel's interpretation
makes international standards promulgated by Codex Alimentarius obligatory in
force and effect."' The Appellate Body argued that the "right of a Member to estab-
lish its own level of sanitary protection under Article 3.3 of the SPSAgreement is an
autonomous right and not an 'exception' from a 'general obligation' under Article
3.1. "19 Although the Appellate Body attempted to counter the notion that inter-
national standards, which technically are only recommendations, become de facto
binding through the SPS Agreement, the requirement that higher than international
standards must be scientifically justified through a risk assessment under Article 5.1
still elevates both the political and legal importance of international standards.
Ironically, science-based harmonization may lead to the international standard-setting
process freezing up because States become reluctant to adopt new standards because
they become, if not necessarily legally binding, significant obstacles to the exercise of
public health sovereignty.
11 John S. Eldred/Shirley A. Coffield, What Every Food Manufacturer Needs to Know:
Realizing the Impact of Globalization on National Food Regulations, Food and Drug Law
Journal, vol. 52, 1997, 31, 32.
116 Alison Maitland, EU Farm Chief Hits at WTO Over Meat Row, Financial Times, 4
September 1997, 26 (reporting EC Farm Commissioner blaming "the WTO sanitary and
phyto-sanitary agreement for 'paralysing' progress in adopting higher food standards.").
17 Hormones Panel Report (note 12), para. 8.86.
18 Hormones Appellate Report (note 13), para. 165.
19 Id., para. 172.
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These examples of science at the mercy of international politics explode any illu-
sion that the appeal to science in the science paradigm escapes politics. Science not
only is embedded in a particular power framework in international relations but also
is subject to the political decisions made by States. Science in the science paradigm is
really 'political science'.
3. National Science? Sovereign Expressions of Science
Science is supposed to transcend national boundaries as an endeavor that produces
universal truths. Yet, controversies in the international trade area suggest that science
can be very national. The 'mad cow' dispute between the United Kingdom and the
EC over the scientific justification for the EC's ban on British beef exports,"'i the
long-running dispute between the EC and the United States over the use of growth
hormones in beef production, and recent U.S.-EC trade squabbles over meat, pork,
and poultry inspection systems'21 all involve scientific clashes as well as trade con-
flicts. Atik argues that "[w]e can anticipate many cases where scientific consensus is
split along national lines."'22 This, of course, raises the specter of trade interests cor-
rupting the scientific process and pre-determining scientific evidence.123 In the science
paradigm, science is supposed to act as a neutral arbiter between public health sov-
ereignty and trade interests. If trade interests in fact drive, or are perceived to be
driving, science, then the attractiveness of the science paradigm wanes considerably.
The convenient tailoring of scientific theories to national economic interests is an
old phenomenon, dating back at least to the nineteenth century. 4 The international
sanitary conferences of the nineteenth century, up to the breakthrough conferences
of the 1890s, were plagued by the great scientific debate over the nature of diseases.
The opponents of national quarantine systems, led by the British, favored the
'miasma' theory of diseases, which posited that cholera and other diseases were not
contagious and thus not carried through the channels of international trade but arose
2
0A tik (note 111), 748 (noting that in the 'mad cow' crisis, "the United Kingdom had main-
tained that the European's Union ban on exports of British beef was entirely without scientific
justification.").
121 See Fidler (note 3), 34, fn. 104 for description of this U.S.-EC trade controversy.
122Atik (note 111), 748.
123 A tik cautions that "we need not reach the cynical view that one group of scientists (say,
the Europeans) is corrupted by the economic interest of its country to account for the division
of opinion."). Id. Scientific uncertainty could also account for the division of science along
national lines; but, even in a situation of scientific uncertainty, why does the division fall along
national lines?
" Howard-Jones (note 55), 26 ("Both the contagionists and anti-contagionists made up their
minds first and then selected the facts that seemed to fit their theories.").
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from bad air or soil where the diseases actually occurred. 2 ' If miasma theory was
correct, then the troublesome system of European quarantine regimes that frustrated
British trade was unnecessary. The British dismantled their quarantine system and
developed an approach that mirrored provisions later adopted in the international
sanitary conventions.'26 Those countries that wanted to keep their quarantine sys-
tems for health and political (e.g., anti-British) reasons favored the contagionist theo-
ry, which argued that diseases were spread between human populations through trade
and that quarantine, thus, was a rational strategy. This 'great debate' took place in a
morass of scientific ignorance until the work of Pasteur and Koch proved contagionist
theory to be correct. In the end, the British did all the right things for the wrong
reasons, and the quarantine-favoring countries did all the wrong things for the right
reason. The whole episode serves to illustrate the intertwining, for better or worse,
of science and national interest in the trade-health linkage.
The vulnerability of science to economic interests is also well illustrated in the
scientific controversies surrounding tobacco consumption. The major American to-
bacco companies have waged a 'scientific' battle for nearly thirty years by producing
research that found no link between smoking and ill-health.' The effort of the to-
bacco companies to deny the dangerous nature of smoking by using science ultimate-
ly failed and was exposed as fraudulent. The ultimate triumph of 'good science' in the
tobacco situation does not, however, remove concerns that the entire episode reveals
about the ability of powerful interests, be they companies or governments, to manip-
ulate science for particular economic and political objectives.
The role of science in international environmental law is also illustrative of prob-
lems facing the science paradigm in the trade-health context. According to Susskind,
science has not played a very strong role in the formulation of international environ-
mental law since 19 7 2 .2s While science helped international negotiations on acid rain,
ozone depletion, and biodiversity, Susskind argues that science "was secondary or
irrelevant in shaping the terms of the treaties dealing with whaling, hazardous waste
trade, tropical deforestation, Antarctic mineral exploitation.... trade in African ele-
phant ivory . . . ocean dumping, world heritage, wetlands and migratory species
125 Goodman (note 51), 38 (discussing doctrine of miasma).
126 Howard-Jones (note 55), 56 (noting that "paradoxically, the measures of sanitary control
advocated and practised by the British were completely in line with the thinking and practice
of today, as exemplified in the International Health Regulations.").
12 See Philip. Hilts, Smoke Screen: The Truth Behind the Tobacco Industry Cover-up, 1996
(analyzing tobacco industry's disinformation machine and tactics).
128 Lawrence Susskind, Environmental Diplomacy: Negotiating More Effective Global
Agreements, 1994, 63 ("A review of most of the international treaties negotiated since the 1972
Stockholm conference shows that scientific evidence has played a surprisingly small role in
issue definition, fact-finding, bargaining, and regime strengthening.").
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protection, and rewriting the Law of the Sea."' 29 In addition, science becomes very
politicized in international environmental negotiations because the complexity of
these issues produces uncertainty that allows politics to dominate the discussions. 3 '
A battle is presently being waged over the science of global warming that reveals the
vulnerability of environmental science to politics. 3' The use of science by States in
the environmental context also shows how science is subordinate to concepts of na-
tional interest and power.'
The science paradigm is premised on science not becoming coopted into the nor-
mal dynamics of international politics. Realism - the dominant international rela-
tions theory since Thucydides'33 - informs us that all aspects of international politics
are about power. In Hans Morgenthau's famous phrase, statesmen think and act in
terms of interest defined as power.'34 In the realist's world, science is no different
from other instruments, such as morality, that are harnessed by sovereign States in
their pursuit of power. While the realist theory is by no means universally accepted,
its dominance over time, and its continued existence, provide one theoretical angle
with which to think about the phenomenon of 'national science'.
4. Science According to Non-Scientists?
The Interpretation and Enforcement of Science-Based Rules of International Law
Another problem with the science paradigm is how science-based rules of interna-
tional law will be interpreted and enforced. The lack of authoritative interpretative
mechanisms is sometimes considered a general weakness of international law.'35
129 Id.
"' Id. (noting that "there will always be self-interested actors willing to exploit scientific un-
certainty for their own ends, arguing against any global action (that would hurt them) on the
grounds that a fuller understanding is required before a clear course of action can be charted.
When scientists acknowledge uncertainty, they allow political actors greater control over deci-
sion making.").
131 See, e.g., j. D. Mahlman, Uncertainties in Projections of Human-Caused Climate Warm-
ing, Science, vol. 278, 1997, 1416, 1417 ("Characterizations of the state of science of greenhouse
warming are often warped in differing ways by people or groups with widely varying sociopo-
litical agendas and biases.").
132 Susskind (note 128), 65 ("When its purposes are served (and we are not alone in this), the
United States uses scientific evidence to argue for the actions it favors. When we prefer to take
a different political course, we attack the available data as insufficient, regardless of the strength
of the worldwide scientific consensus.").
133 Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, European Journal
of International Law, vol. 6, 1995, 1, 5.
134 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 5th ed. rev. 1978, 5.
139 See H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 1961, 209 (arguing that international law lacks "a
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Similarly, enforcement is sometimes considered the great black hole for international
law, into which its finely crafted rules are sucked into non-existence. Thus, discussing
the interpretation and enforcement issues in the trade-health context should come as
no surprise. But, at least in terms of international trade law, the interpretation and
enforcement problems are not the classical concerns. In this Part IV.4, I explore the
interpretation and enforcement issues confronting both international health law and
international trade law.
a) International Health Law
Commentators have frequently observed that the IHR suffer from frequent non-
compliance by WHO member States.136 Member States of the WHO often do not
report outbreaks of diseases subject to the IHR and often impose measures against
other member States suffering outbreaks that go beyond the maximum measures pro-
vided in the Regulations. The WHO historically has shown no interest in moni-
toring or enforcing the IHR. This reluctance is explained by the powerful non-legal
ethos at WHO"' and by the unwillingness on the part of WHO member States to
empower WHO against themselves.
The non-enforcement of the IHR's rules seriously erodes the effectiveness of the
science paradigm. The scientifically-informed rules of the IHR are not observed,
which means science is not driving WHO member State behavior in the IHR con-
text. The science paradigm in the IHR seems irrelevant to State behavior, which is
contrary to the purpose of using science to balance sovereignty and trade interests.
b) International Trade Law
A key difference between the SPS Agreement and the IHR is that the former is
plugged into a powerful dispute resolution system in the form of the WTO's dispute
settlement regime. WTO member States accused of violating the SPS Agreement can-
not prevent the complaining State from bringing the dispute before a WTO dispute
unifying rule of recognition specifying 'sources' of law and providing general criteria for the
identification of its rules.").
136 See, e.g., Fidler (note 22), 843- 849; and Allyn L. Taylor, Controlling the Global Spread of
Infectious Diseases: Toward a Reinforced Role for the International Health Regulations,
Houston Law Review, vol. 33, 1997, 1327, 1352.
"
7 SeeAllyn L. Taylor, Making the World Health Organization Work: A Legal Framework
for Universal Access to the Conditions for Health, American Journal of Law and Medicine,
vol. 18, 1992, 301, 303 (WHO's unwillingness to use law and legal institutions "stems, in large
part, from the organizational culture established by the conservative medical professional
community that dominates the institution.").
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resolution panel. The science paradigm in the SPS Agreement has, as a result, a so-
phisticated and public mechanism for interpreting, monitoring, and enforcing its
rules.
While avoiding the problems that have plagued the 1HR, the dispute settlement
system linked to the SPS Agreement raises other important concerns. The two most
prominent are: (1) the interpretation of scientific evidence by WTO dispute resolu-
tion panels, and (2) the application of the trade-related disciplines to scientifically-
justified public health measures.
aa) The Interpretation of Scientific Evidence
by WTO Dispute Resolution Panels
As demonstrated by the BeefHormones Case, in SPS Agreement cases the WTO
will have to decide whether a member State has scientifically justified a challenged
SPS measure. In essence, a panel of non-scientists will be making scientific determina-
tions."' This situation raises concerns about the competence of WTO dispute panels
to make scientific judgments when rival scientific cases are made. The SPS Agreement
attempts to address this in allowing WTO panels to have access to scientific experts
to help it through the thickets of scientific controversy."' Where an international
standard has been set, then worries about the competence of the WTO panel might
be less sharp because ostensibly an authoritative scientific body has evaluated the
evidence. But competence issues might remain: how does the WTO panel determine
whether the challenged State has provided a scientific justification for a measure that
is more stringent than international standards? In appealing the Hormones Panel
Report, for example, the EC argued that the WTO panel "disregarded and distorted
the evidence with regard to both the... hormones at issue supplied by the Panel's
experts, as well as the scientific evidence presented by the European Communities." 
140
The competence concern boils down to a question of deference: how much defer-
ence is a WTO panel going to give to the scientific evidence and arguments of a
'38 DavidA. Wirth, The Role of Science in the Uruguay Round and NAFTA Trade Disci-
plines, Cornell International Law Journal, vol. 27, 1994, 817, 843 ("An additional issue arises
when decision-makers in an adjudicatory setting, such as members of GATT panels, are lay
persons and not technical experts who are specially trained in the scientific discipline to a par-
ticular dispute."); Charnovitz (note 105), 490 (noting that "the use of science in judicial review
is a rapidly evolving field - one that ad hoc GATT panels would seem ill-equipped to
handle.").
" SPS Agreement (note 83), Art. 11.2. The Appellate Body upheld how the panel in the
BeefHormones Case utilized scientific experts. Hormones Appellate Report (note 13), paras.
146- 154.
140 Hormones Appellate Report (note 13), para. 17.
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WTO member State? Another way to think about this is formulating a standard of
review for scientific evidence: will WTO panels use a standard like 'rational review'
or 'heightened scrutiny' or a more rigorous 'cost-benefit analysis'? Wirth has argued
that WTO and NAFTA panels have to accord national regulatory authorities defer-
ence on scientific issues.141 He believes that dispute resolution panels should conduct
a procedural rather than a substantive review of the scientific evidence presented and
only look for a "minimal level of scientific evidence." 4 2 In appealing the Hormones
Panel Report, the EC similarly argued "that WTO panels should adopt a deferential
'reasonableness' standard when reviewing a Member's decision to adopt a particular
science policy or a Member's determination that a particular inference from the
available data is scientifically plausible." 43
The SPS Agreement appears to require, however, WTO panels to apply a standard
of review that is more critical than a rational review approach, Wirth's procedural
approach, or the EC's deferential 'reasonableness' standard but not as stringent as a
cost-benefit calculus or a de novo standard of review because it requires a showing of
'sufficient scientific evidence' supporting SPS measures.' In addition, the Appellate
Body in the Beef Hormones Case pointed out that, under Article 11 of the WTO
Dispute Settlement Understanding, panels should make an objective assessment of
the facts in all cases. 4 ' The Appellate Body held that an objective assessment of the
facts involved more than deference and less than de novo review of the facts. 46 In the
Hormones Panel Report, the panel took a heightened scrutiny approach by (1) using
individual scientific experts to assist its deliberations on scientific matters, 147 and (2)
closely examining the EC's scientific case supporting the import ban.'48 In addition,
Codex Alimentarius had set international standards for five of the six growth hor-
141 Wirth (note 138), 854 - 855.
142 Id., 856.
143 Hormones Appellate Report (note 13), para. 14.
'"SPS Agreement (note 83), Art. 2.2. A tik comments that "[t]he requirement that a SPS
measure be premised on a scientific basis represents a middle-ground between a more searching
cost-benefit analysis that introduces international economic values and the quite liberating ra-
tional relationship test." A tik (note 111), 745. Barcel6 argues that the European Court of Justice
uses a cost-benefit balancing test in its rulings on measures taken to protect public health that
restrict intra-EC trade. Jobnj. Barceld III, Product Standards to Protect the Local Environment
- the GATT and the Uruguay Round Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement, Cornell Inter-
national Law Journal, vol. 27, 1994, 755, 771 - 772.
"I Hormones Appellate Report (note 13), para. 116.
146 Id., para. 117.
147 Hormones Panel Report (note 12), para. 8.7.
148 Id., paras. 8.117 - 8.159. As Charnovitz observed, "[t]he panel accorded no deference to
the Commission's factual findings." Charnovitz (note 106), 1785.
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mones in issue in the case,149 which provided the WTO panel with an independent
scientific foundation against which to evaluate the EC measures. It also helped the
WTO panel that none of the scientific studies cited by the EC supported its position
at all,' suggesting that the EC import ban would not have survived even a rational
review standard.' The Appellate Body upheld the standard of review applied by the
panel."'
Other, more difficult, cases are likely to present themselves under the SPS Agree-
ment in which the WTO panel's competence to make scientific determinations will
be more questionable. Atik observes that "[e]ven more challenging would be cases...
where affirmative scientific justifications can be argued both for the regulation and
for its removal."5 3 Atik cites the EC's muesli case as an example. Sandoz produced
muesli cereal enhanced with vitamins to promote good health, and such vitamin sup-
plementation was legal in Germany and Belgium. The Netherlands, on the other
hand, banned the importation of such muesli because it might be harmful to human
health by encouraging the consumption of fat-soluble vitamins.' Other products
might also have mixed health effects in a population that could be regulated in ways
that trigger SPS Agreement scrutiny.155 It is not clear at this point how WTO panels
will approach such difficult scientific determinations.' s The Appellate Body clearly
held in the BeefHormones Case that the Dispute Settlement Understanding mandates
that the heightened scrutiny approach embodied in the 'objective assessment of the
facts' standard be applied by WTO panels, but how such a standard of review oper-
ates in cases with more complicated scientific controversies than the BeefHormones
Case remains to be seen.
If the experience of American federal courts in dealing with scientific evidence is
any guide, the WTO panels attempting to make scientific determinations in the SPS
Agreement context are in for a controversial future. The handling of science in
American federal court litigation may point to problems that WTO panels will face
in SPS Agreement disputes. The major controversy has been the standard of admissi-
bility for scientific evidence. The 'general acceptance' test prevailed in federal courts
" Hormones Panel Report (note 12), para. 8.159.
150 Id., para. 8.137.
"' Charnovitz (note 106), 1785 (noting that "[f]rom the panel's perspective, there wasn't
much to accord deference to.").
152 Hormones Appellate Report (note 13), para. 119.
1 3A tik (note 111), 757.
114 Id., 754. See Case 174/82, Criminal Proceedings Against Sandoz BV, 1983 ECR 2445.
"I SeeAtik (note 111), 757 (noting that "SPS measures present many of these difficult cases"
and referring to pharmaceutical products that have both harmful and healthful effects).
156 Charnovitz (note 106), 1785 ("Whether panels should accord deference remains an unre-
solved issue in WTO jurisprudence.").
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from 1923 until 1993. Under this test, federal courts admitted scientific evidence from
the litigants if the evidence was generally accepted as reliable by the appropriate
scientific community."5 7 In 1993, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that the general ac-
ceptance test has "been much debated, and scholarship on its proper scope and
application legion. "'58 In the same case, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Federal
Rules of Evidence, not the general acceptance test, governed the admissibility of
scientific evidence in federal courts."5 9 Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, all
relevant evidence is admissible; and expert witnesses may provide testimony on scien-
tific evidence if it will assist the trier of fact. 6' The Supreme Court held that nothing
in the Federal Rules of Evidence indicates that they incorporate the general accept-
ance test.' Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the federal trial judge "must ensure
that any and all scientific testimony admitted is not only relevant, but reliable."'62
The trial judge is to act as a 'gatekeeper' by screening scientific evidence for its rele-
vance and reliability.'63 The foci of the gatekeeper approach set out in Daubert is
"whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically
valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the
facts in issue."'64 In short, American federal courts have moved from a standard that
focused on the end results of scientific inquiry (the general acceptance test) to a
standard that focuses on the reliability and relevance of the methodology of the scien-
tific inquiry (the gatekeeper approach).
The gatekeeper approach has, however, come under fire from both judges and
commentators. Kesan has, for example, noted that "[m]any judges have expressed dis-
comfort at having to review methodologies and techniques that undergird scientific
evidence presented in courts." 6 ' The results produced by the gatekeeper approach
have contradicted the U.S. Supreme Court's confident prediction "that federal judges
s Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 P.C. Cir. 1923) (holding that for scientific evi-
dence to be admissible it "must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in
the particular field to which it belongs.").
158 Daubert et ux., individually and as guardians ad litem for Daubert, et al. v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 586 (1993).
'" Id., 587.
160 Id., 587 - 588 (citing Rules 402 and 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence).
161 Id., 588.
162 Id., 589.
163 General Electric Company, etat v.Joiner, etux., 1997 LEXIS 7503, 15 December 1997, 12
(interpreting Daubert).
164 Daubert (note 158), 592 - 593.
16s Jay P. Kesan, A Critical Examination of the Post-Daubert Scientific Evidence Landscape,
Food and Drug Law Journal, vol. 52, 1997, 225, 225.
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possess the capacity to undertake this review."166 Kesan writes: "The result of these
gatekeeping exercises is a tortured landscape of post-Daubert decisions, which are
non-uniform, inconsistent, and irreconcilable. 
"
o
1
67
Within the BeefHormones Case, a similar shift from a general acceptance test to a
gatekeeper approach may have occurred as the case moved from the panel to the
appellate stage. The Appellate Body took issue with the panel over its handling of the
'substantive requirements' of the risk assessment required by Article 5.1 of the SPS
Agreement. In the opinion of the Appellate Body, the panel wrongly interpreted
Article 5.1 to require that the scientific conclusions reflected in the relevant SPS
measure must conform to the scientific conclusions of the risk assessment.'68 The
Appellate Body explicitly rejected the notion, implicitly fostered by the panel's
interpretation, that Article 5.1 incorporates a general acceptance test: "Article 5.1
does not require that the risk assessment must necessarily embody only the view of
the majority of the relevant scientific community."169 In addition, the Appellate Body
rejected an implication it sensed in the Hormones Panel Report that the risk assess-
ment required by Article 5.1 mandated "a certain magnitude or threshold level of risk
be demonstrated."17 In other words, the SPS Agreement does not require that a risk
cross a minimum threshold of probability to support a SPS measure. 7'
All that is required by the Article 5.1 risk assessment is that a reasonable relation-
ship exist between the SPS measure and the risk identified in the risk assessment. 72
While acknowledging that States base most SPS measures on "'mainstream' scientific
opinion,"' the Appellate Body argued that "equally responsible and representative
governments may act in good faith on the basis of what, at a given time, may be a
divergent opinion coming from qualified and respected sources." 74 The Appellate
Body has rejected a general acceptance approach to scientific evidence in favor of a
test that looks to the reliability and relevance of such evidence - does it come from
16 Daubert (note 158), 593.
167 Kesan (note 165), 251.
168 Hormones Appellate Report (note 13), paras. 193 - 194. See Hormones Panel Report
(note 12), para. 8.137 (arguing that "the scientific conclusion reflected in the EC measures in
dispute... does not conform to any of the scientific conclusions reached in the evidence re-
ferred to by the European Communities.").
... Hormones Appellate Report (note 13), para. 194.
170 Id., para. 186.
171 Id. ("To the extent that the Panel purported to require a risk assessment to establish a
minimum magnitude of risk, we must note that imposition of such a quantitative requirement
finds no basis in the SPSAgreement.") See also id., para. 184.
172 Id., paras. 193 - 194.
... Id., para. 194.
'74 Id.
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a 'qualified and respected source' and does it reasonably support the SPS measure at
issue?
One interpretation of the Hormones Appellate Report is that the Appellate Body
has mandated an approach to scientific evidence that is even more liberal than the
Daubert gatekeeper standard in U.S. federal courts because it did not specifically
require WTO panels to examine the methodology underlying the scientific reason-
ing. The approach of the Appellate Body makes clear, however, that WTO panels
should examine whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the evidence ap-
plies to the facts of the case. The Appellate Body noted, for example, that much of
the scientific literature produced by the EC did not evaluate the carcinogenic poten-
tial of the relevant hormones when used for animal growth promotion."' 5 The Appel-
late Body has, in essence, mandated that WTO panels be Daubert-like gatekeepers for
scientific evidence presented in future SPS Agreement cases by WTO member States.
In one important respect, however, a WTO gatekeeper approach is different from
the Daubert standard. Under Daubert, the scientific evidence is still subject to jury
deliberations after having been admitted by the gatekeeper. The jury may reject the
evidence and the legal claims flowing from it. Under the Hormones Appellate Re-
port, if the scientific evidence is relevant and comes from reliable sources, then the
SPS measure at issue will in all likelihood bear a rational relationship to the evidence,
which means that the WTO member State has satisfied its science-based legal obliga-
tions under the SPS Agreement. A panel could not, at that point, reject the evidence
as not in conformity with mainstream scientific knowledge - as could a domestic
jury. Under the Hormones Appellate Report, once the evidence is past the panel
gatekeepers, legal consequences automatically result.17' Just as under Daubert it is
easier for a litigant to get scientific evidence admitted, under the gatekeeper approach
crafted in the Hormones Appellate Report it will be easier for a WTO member State
to satisfy the science-based disciplines of the SPS Agreement than under a WTO
version of the general acceptance test.
In the Beef Hormones Case, the EC could not even satisfy the WTO gatekeeper
standard because it did not produce relevant scientific evidence that rationally sup-
ported its import ban. Although the WTO gatekeeper approach appeared to work in
the Beef Hormones Case, trouble may still be looming ahead, if U.S. federal court
travails with the Daubert test are any indication. WTO panels may confront harder
cases than the Beef Hormones Case. In fact, the EC proclaimed victory when the Ap-
pellate Body released its decision because it believed it had succeeded in achieving
175 Id., paras. 199 - 200.
176 This distinction between Daubert and the WTO flows from the fact that under the SPS
Agreement and Dispute Settlement Understanding all evidence is admitted to the ultimate
decision makers (i.e., the panel members) for consideration, whereas under Daubert a federal
judge may not allow certain scientific evidence to reach the jury.
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legal interpretations that would allow it to satisfy the science-based discipline of the
SPS Agreement.'77 Apparently the EC is at work on a new risk assessment that it be-
lieves will pass muster under the Appellate Body's interpretations of the SPS Agree-
ment. 78 More generally, WTO gatekeeping exercises might evolve into a tortured
landscape of post-BeefHormones Case decisions that are non-uniform, inconsistent,
and irreconcilable because the gatekeeper approach will not prove any easier to use
within the WTO than in U.S. federal courts.,
The role WTO panels will play in interpreting scientific evidence also raises the
question about the quality of the international standards on which they will lean for
scientific support. The BeefHormones Case illustrates this problem. In this case, the
EC argued that the vote in the Codex Alimentarius on the international standards in
question was very close (33 votes for, 29 against, and seven abstentions),179 suggesting
that the international standards established in the Codex process did not represent a
clear scientific victory for the United States' position. The WTO panel ruled that
whether an international standard is adopted by a wide or narrow margin is not
relevant because of the unambiguous command in Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement
that WTO member States base their health protection measures on existing interna-
tional standards.8 ' Narrow votes in international standards-setting organizations
clearly raise, however, scientific and legal concerns. Does a close and controversial
vote mean that there is no scientific consensus? Does the close and controversial vote
mean that politics has infiltrated what is supposed to be a scientific, technical en-
deavor? Despite the Appellate Body's effort to disparage the notion that international
standards become legally binding through the SPS Agreement, the Beef Hormones
Case raises the stake of each and every vote in standard-setting international organiza-
tions, perhaps contributing to the politicization and paralyzation of these processes.
More importantly, it suggests that international standard setting does not escape the
problems haunting the science paradigm.
Other aspects of the BeefHormones Case raise questions about the operation of the
science paradigm in international trade disputes. For example, the Appellate Body
held that the panel erred as a matter of law in allocating the evidentiary burden of
proof to (1) the member State that imposes a SPS measure as a general matter, and (2)
the member State that imposes a SPS measure that is more protective than relevant
international standards.' Interestingly, the Appellate Body held that the SPS Agree-
17 Trade Disputes: Big Beef, The Economist, 24 January 1998, 71 (noting that both the U.S.
and EC proclaimed victory after the Appellate Body released its decision).
17, Id. (noting that the "EC can keep the ban in place for another 15 months while it studies
the alleged risks all over again.").
Hormones Panel Report (note 12), para. 8.67.
180 Id., para. 8.69. The Appellate Body did not address this issue in its decision.
... Hormones Appellate Report (note 13), para. 253(a).
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ment differs from the traditional relationship between GATT obligations and Article
XX(b) claims."' Under GATT, the party relying on Article XX(b) bears the burden
of satisfying the conditions laid out in that Article.183 But, under the SPS Agreement,
the Appellate Body held that the complaining member State bears the burden of
establishing through evidence and legal arguments aprimafacie case that the member
State imposing the SPS measure has violated the SPS Agreement.'84 So, the Appellate
Body determined "that the United States and Canada have to make aprimafacie case
that these [SPS] measures are not based on a risk assessment."'8 The Appellate Body's
allocation of the burden of proof to the complaining member State may make chal-
lenging SPS measures more difficult and certainly accords more deference to public
health sovereignty than the allocation of the burden of proof under Article XX(b) of
GATT.
186
In addition, it raises questions about the relationship between Article XX(b) and
the SPS Agreement. In the Hormones Panel Report, the panel held that the SPS
Agreement stands alone and does not require the existence of a prior violation of
GATT in order to be violated by a member State."' But, the panel also held that "if
a violation of GATT were found, we would need to consider whether Article XX(b)
could be invoked and would then necessarily need to examine the SPS Agreement. "
1 88
Under traditional Article XX(b) analysis, the State invoking Article XX(b) bears the
burden of establishing that the measure meets the trade-related disciplines in the
chapeau of Article XX and the necessary requirement in Article XX(b) itself. If the
panel must look to the SPS Agreement to interpret the validity of an Article XX(b)
claim, the Appellate Body appears to reverse the onus of the burden of proof by
placing it on the complaining party not the party invoking Article XX(b). Such a
result would constitute a radical departure from prior Article XX(b) jurisprudence.
The Appellate Body also held that the panel erred as a matter of law in bifurcating
risk analysis into 'risk assessment', which involves only scientific factors, and 'risk
management', which can involve non-scientific factors.'89 Under the SPS Agreement,
risk assessment is the only requirement; and member States can factor into risk assess-
182 Id., para. 104.
183 Id.
184 Id., paras. 108 - 109.
'85 Id., para. 197, fn. 180.
"' The Appellate Body did determine that the U.S. and Canada had both made the
necessary prima facie case that the EC's import ban was not based on a risk assessment. Id.,
para. 197, fn. 180.
117 Hormones Panel Report (note 12), paras. 8.31 - 8.42.
18 Id., para. 8.42.
189 Hormones Appellate Report (note 13), para. 181. See Hormones Panel Report (note 12),
paras. 8.94 - 8.95.
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ments "not only risk ascertainable in a science laboratory operating under strictly
controlled conditions, but also risk in human societies as they actually exist, in other
words, the actual potential for adverse effects on human health in the real world
where people live and work and die."" ° The Appellate Body broadened the scope of
risk assessment from the narrow, purely scientific process envisioned by the panel.
While this broadening did not affect the outcome of the Beef Hormones Case,'91 it
creates more flexibility for public health sovereignty because risk assessments may
examine and evaluate all "risks for human health whatever their precise and imme-
diate origin may be.""
The Appellate Body also reversed the panel on an issue relating to the harmoniza-
tion element of the science paradigm. As noted earlier, the panel held that Article 3.3
of the SPS Agreement is an exception to the general obligation in Articles 3.1 and 3.2
to harmonize SPS measures on international standards. Thus, a failure to justify
scientifically a higher than international standard under Article 3.3 also triggered a
violation of Article 3.1's harmonization duty. The Appellate Body interpreted the
relationship between Articles 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 differently. First, the Appellate Body
reversed the panel's holding that 'based on' international standards in Article 3.1 was
the same as 'conform to' international standards in Article 3.2.' This interpretation
produces two harmonization strategies: (1) national SPS measures can be based on,
but not identical to, international standards (Article 3.1); and (2) national SPS meas-
ures can conform to, or be identical to, international standards (Article 3.2). Only
national SPS measures that conform to international standards enjoy the benefit of
the presumption that such measures are consistent with the SPS Agreement and
GATT."4 But, under the burden of proof ruling, a member State challenging a SPS
measure based on but not conforming to international standards must show a prima
facie case that the measure is either not based on an international standard or incon-
sistent with the risk assessment obligations."'
As for member States imposing higher than international standards under Article
3.3, the Appellate Body stressed that the right to adopt such higher standards "is an
autonomous right and not an 'exception' from a 'general [harmonization] obligation'
under Article 3.1." "' A violation of Article 3.3 resulting from a failure to provide a
0 Hormones Appellate Report (note 13), para. 187.
"'The Appellate Body held that the EC did not provide an assessment of the risks "arising
from the failure of observance of good veterinary practice combined with problems of control
of the use of hormones for growth promotion purposes." Id., para. 208.
'92Id., para. 206.
'9' Id., paras. 163 - 166.
94 Id., para. 170.
195 Id., para. 171.
196 Id., para. 172.
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scientific justification for a higher standard does not, in the Appellate Body's view,
also produce a violation of the harmonization provision in Article 3.1 197 The Appel-
late Body's interpretation of Articles 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 does not, however, adversely
affect the harmonization element of the science paradigm because two of the three
options involve harmonization strategies (Articles 3.1 and 3.2) while the non-harmo-
nization option (Article 3.3) remains subject to the science disciplines of the SPS
Agreement.
bb) The Application of the Trade-Related Disciplines
to Scientifically-Justified SPS Measures
Another concern about the WTO dispute settlement system involves the applica-
tion of the trade-related disciplines (i.e., the necessary requirement, the no unjustified
discrimination requirement, and the no disguised restriction on trade requirement) to
scientifically-justified SPS measures. Having a scientific basis for a SPS measure does
not end the analysis under the SPS Agreement because all SPS measures must alsb
satisfy the trade-related disciplines. Of the three trade-related disciplines, the most
controversial is the necessary requirement, which many people argue has been inter-
preted in such a narrow fashion that legitimate sovereign health concerns are sub-
ordinated to trade interests.
aaa) Discrimination and Disguised Restrictions
The requirement that a SPS measure not constitute arbitrary or unjustified dis-
crimination... flows from the most-favored-nation principle that is a pillar of GATT
law."' The prohibition on SPS measures constituting disguised restrictions on inter-
national trade2" derives from the GATT principle of national treatment."' Given the
importance of the most-favored-nation and national treatment principles in GATT,
the application of these trade-related disciplines is not surprising and is relatively
uncontroversial. Banning the importation of a product from one country because of
a perceived health risk but not the like product from another country posing exactly
the same health risk does not make public health sense since the risk is the same.
Similarly, banning an imported product with a health risk while allowing a like
"' Id., para. 253(h).
... GATT (note 67), Art. XX (chapeau); SPS Agreement (note 83), arts. 2.3 and 5.5.
"
9 GATT (note 67), Art. I.
2 oId., Art. XX (chapeau); SPS Agreement (note 83), arts. 2.3 and 5.5.
201 GATT (note 67), Art. mH.
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domestic product with the same risk to be sold and consumed raises questions about
the public health sincerity of the government's action.
The controversy over Thailand's banning of imported cigarettes while allowing
the sale of domestic cigarettes raised these very questions. In attacking the Thai ciga-
rette import ban, the United States believed that Thailand was using public health as
a smokescreen for protectionism. 2 Leading scholars also viewed the Thai cigarette
import ban as protectionism rather than a legitimate public health measure." 3 Char-
novitz argued that the Thai panel "reached the right conclusion but for the wrong
reason" by basing its holding on the necessary requirement rather than on the dis-
guised restriction to trade prohibition."° The facts of the Thai Cigarette Case demon-
strate, however, that it can make public health sense to ban an imported product
posing a health risk while allowing a like domestic product with the same risk to be
consumed. Thailand's import ban represented a key element in its overall effort to
reduce smoking. In addition to the import ban, Thailand had banned cigarette ad-
vertising, imposed a requirement for warning labels on cigarette packages, and re-
duced its own cigarette exports.'05 Given the evidence that cigarette consumption
increased in other markets after being forced open by the United States,2 06 the Thai
import ban was not clearly a protectionist measure disguised as a public health
policy.
The Beef Hormones Case also contains some interesting arguments and holdings
concerning the 'discrimination' and 'disguised restrictions on trade' disciplines. The
SPS Agreement imposes both these disciplines generally in Article 2.3 and then more
specifically in Article 5.5.207 Neither the panel nor the Appellate Body interpreted
Article 2.3 in detail in the Bee/Hormones Case. The controversy came in interpreting
Article 5.5. Article 5.5 prohibits member States from having SPS measures that
contain arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in measures designed for different situa-
tions if such distinctions result in discrimination or a disguised restriction on interna-
tional trade."' The Appellate Body held that a member State complaining of a viola-
202 In 1990, the U.S. Trade Representative argued that "I don't see how health concerns can
enter the picture if the people are smoking their own cigarettes .... They smoke a whole lot
of their own cigarettes." Quoted in Suthiphon Thaveecbaiyagarn, Current Developments: The
Section 301 Cigarette Case Against Thailand - A Thai Perspective, Law and Policy in Interna-
tional Business, vol. 21, 1990, 367, 384.
203 Charnovitz (note 67), 326 fn. 145 (arguing in connection with the Thai import ban that
"[i]t is difficult to imagine a clearer example of a 'disguised restriction' on trade.").
204 Id.
205 Thaveechaiyagarn (note 202), 374, 375 fn 56.
216 Id., 377.
27 SPS Agreement (note 83), arts. 2.3 and 5.5.
208 Id., Art. 5.5.
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tion of Article 5.5 has to show (1) that the accused member State has adopted SPS
measures against risks in several different situations; (2) that the levels of protection
exhibit arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in their application in different situa-
tions; and (3) that the arbitrary and unjustified distinctions result in discrimination or
a disguised restriction on international trade. 9 What this construction of Article 5.5
means is that there is no violation if the distinctions in levels of SPS protection are
only arbitrary and unjustified.21 While the Appellate Body agreed with the panel
that one distinction in EC levels of protection was unjustified,211 it reversed the
panel's holding that the unjustifiable distinction constituted a discrimination or a
disguised restriction on international trade. The panel based its holding on prior
Appellate Body rulings on the meaning of the trade-related disciplines in the
chapeau of Article XX,21 but the Appellate Body did not believe that these rulings
could simply be imported to interpret Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement.214 In other
words, the trade-related disciplines in Article 5.5 do not mirror those in the
chapeau of Article XX. The question that arises from the Hormones Appellate Re-
port is whether proving violations of the trade-related disciplines in Article 5.5 is
more difficult than under Article XX of GATT. The unjustifiable distinction com-
bined with the significant size of the discrepancy in levels of protection was not
enough to support a finding that the EC ban was a disguised restriction on interna-
tional trade.215 The weight of those considerations was counterbalanced, according to
the Appellate Body, by
the depth and extent of the anxieties experienced within the European Communities con-
cerning the results of general scientific studies .... the dangers of abuse.., of hormones and
other substances used for growth promotion and the intense concern of consumers within
the European Communities over the quality and drug-free character of the meat available
in its internal market.216
In this case, good faith irrationality fueled by consumers shielded the EC from
being found in violation of the trade-related disciplines in Article 5.5.
209 Hormones Appellate Report (note 13), para. 214.
210 Id., para. 215 (arguing that "both the second and third elements must be found.").
211 Id., para. 235. The Appellate Body reversed the panel's rulings that some distinctions
were arbitrary and unjustified. See id., paras. 219 -235.
212 Id., para. 246.
21 Hormones Panel Report (note 12), paras. 8.182 - 8.184.
'14 Hormones Appellate Report (note 13), para. 239. This is another example where the
Appellate Body distances the SPS Agreement from Article XX jurisprudence.
215 Id., para. 240.
216 Id., para. 245.
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bbb) The Necessary Requirement
More controversial historically in the area of the trade-related disciplines is the
interpretation of the necessary requirement. In the Thai Cigarette Case, the GATT
panel ruled "that the import restrictions imposed by Thailand could be considered to
be 'necessary' in terms of Article XX(b) only if there were no alternative measure
consistent with the General Agreement, or less inconsistent with it, which Thailand
could reasonably be expected to employ to achieve its health policy objectives.""
This interpretation of the necessary requirement in Article XX(b) has also been
followed by the GATT panel in the Tuna-Dolphin Case' and the WTO panel in the
U.S. Gasoline Case.219 The SPS Agreement appears to follow this GATT jurispru-
dence because (1) Article 2.2 states that "Members shall ensure that any sanitary or
phytosanitary measure is applied only to the extent necessary to protect human,
animal or plant life or health; and (2) Article 5.6 requires that SPS measures be "not
more trade restrictive than required to achieve their appropriate level of sanitary or
phytosanitary protection, taking into account technical and economic feasibility."
220
A SPS measure is more trade-restrictive than required if "there is another measure,
reasonably available taking into account technical and economic feasibility, that
achieves the appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection and is signifi-
cantly less restrictive to trade."221
Forcing States to adopt the least trade-restrictive policy possible has come under
criticism as a standard that unduly favors trade over health and that represents an un-
warranted restriction on public health sovereignty." The United States has, for
example, expressly rejected the least trade-restrictive interpretation of the necessary
requirement in the interpretation of the necessary requirement found in NAFTA
217 Thai Cigarette Case (note 36), para. 75.
218 Tuna-Dolphin Case (note 93), para. 5.28.
219 U.S. Gasoline Case (note 94), para. 6.24. The WTO panel in the BeefHormones Case did
not interpret the necessary requirement in the SPS Agreement. The United States and Canada
appealed to the Appellate Body that the panel should have addressed this issue by interpreting
Articles 2.2 and 5.6 of the SPS Agreement. Hormones Appellate Report (note 13), para. 74.
The Appellate Body upheld the panel's decision not to interpret Articles 2.2 and 5.6. Id., para.
250.
220 SPS Agreement (note 83), arts. 2.2 and 5.6.
" Id., Art. 5.6, fn. 3.
' Jeffrey Dunoffargues that "[als the Thai Cigarette and Tuna-Dolphin cases demonstrate,
in practice it is almost impossible to meet the requirement that a trade measure be the least
GATT inconsistent remedy reasonably available." Jeffrey L Dunoff, Institutional Misfits: The
GATT, the ICJ & Trade-Environment Disputes, Michigan Journal of International Law, vol.
15, 1994, 1043, 1063.
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SPS provisions. 23 In the scholarly literature, Schoenbaum argues that the least trade-
restrictive interpretation of the necessary requirement in Article XX(b) relates to the
protection of living things not to whether the measure is a necessary departure from
GATT obligations. 24 Schoenbaum advocates that a SPS measure that has a scientific
basis should then only be judged against the discrimination and disguised restriction
of trade disciplines.2 ' He argues that "in deciding what is 'necessary', WTO panels
should employ a 'rule of reason' approach that allows some freedom of action to
member states."226 In other words, a scientifically-based SPS measure does not have to
be the least trade-restrictive measure possible, which creates more room for public
health sovereignty in selecting policy options. A scientifically-based SPS measure will
only be ruled incompatible with GATT law if it imposes an unreasonable burden on
international trade or if it is applied in a discriminatory manner in violation of the
most-favored-nation or national treatment principles.
One way to work through this rule of reason approach is to apply it to the facts
of the Thai Cigarette Case, which is the source of the traditional interpretation of
'necessary' in Article XX(b). In this case, the GATT panel ruled that the Thai import
ban, which violated Article XI of GATT, was not necessary because the Thais had
alternative measures available that could have been applied consistently with GATT
obligations. To meet its goals of ensuring the quality of cigarettes consumed in Thai-
land and of reducing the quantity of cigarettes sold, Thailand could have instituted
(1) strict, non-discriminatory labeling and ingredient disclosure regulations and a ban
on unhealthy additives to address the quality concern,2 7 and (2) a ban on cigarette
advertising of both domestic and foreign brands to deal with the quantity concern.2
28
The end result of the GATT panel's least trade-restrictive interpretation of the
necessary requirement was the opening of the Thai market to American and other
countries' tobacco exports. Since the opening of national markets to tobacco im-
ports, smoking in Thailand and other Asian countries has increased dramatically,
compounding the public health problems caused by tobacco consumption in Asian
countries." This outcome in Thailand's case was entirely foreseeable. In its expert
'2' Barceld (note 144), 769 ("in interpreting NAFTA article 712(5) [which contains the re-
quirement that SPS measures only be applied to the extent necessary]... the U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative expressly claimed that the article does not impose a 'least-trade-restrictive' require-
ment.").
224 Schoenbaum (note 7), 276.
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Thai Cigarette Case (note 36), para. 77.
28 Id., para. 78.
" Lown (note 28) (noting that after the U.S. government successfully pressured Japan, Tai-
wan, South Korea, and Thailand to allow the sale of American cigarettes "smoking soared
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submission to the GATT panel in the Thai Cigarette Case, the WHO "stated that the
experience in Latin America and Asia showed that the opening of closed cigarette
markets dominated by a state tobacco monopoly resulted in an increase in smok-
ing."230 In addition, the WHO commented on the effect of advertising regulations on
big tobacco companies: "Multinational tobacco companies had routinely circum-
vented national restrictions on advertising through indirect advertising and a variety
of other techniques."231 The GATT panel never addressed why it believed Thailand
would be successful in opening its market to tobacco imports and in reducing
smoking when the opposite had happened everywhere else in the developing world
where tobacco imports were allowed. 2 Opening the Thai market to imports from
the major Anglo-American tobacco companies through the least trade-restrictive
interpretation of the necessary requirement in Article XX(b) directly contributed to
the exponential worsening of the public health problems Thailand was experiencing
because of tobacco consumption. 3 The interpretation of 'necessary' proved a boon
among young people").
230 Thai Cigarette Case (note 36), para. 55. Thailand made these facts part of its arguments:
"Since the health consequences of the opening of cigarette markets constituted one of the ma-
jor justifications for Thailand's cigarette import regime, Thailand deemed it necessary that the
panel consult with experts from the World Health Organization (WHO) on recent experience
in countries which had been made to open their markets for cigarettes. This showed that once
a market was opened, the United States cigarette industry would exert great efforts to force
governments to accept terms and conditions which undermined public health and governments
were left with no effective tool to carry out public health policies. Advertising bans were
circumvented and modern marketing techniques were used to boost sales, Hence, Thailand was
of the view that an import ban was the only measure which could protect public health." Id.,
para. 27.
231 d. In its submissions, Thailand also argued that, despite the import ban on foreign ciga-
rettes, "foreign cigarette manufacturers had advertised on Thai television, in mass circulation
newspapers and on billboards. Indirect advertising had also taken place and the logos of ciga-
rette manufacturers had appeared on clothing and many other non-tobacco products." Id., para.
21.
232 Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Reconciling International Trade with Preservation of the Global Com-
mons: Can We Proposer and Protect?, Washington and Lee Law Review, vol. 49, 1992, 1407,
1449 (noting that "the Panel did not consider the relative effectiveness of the import ban as
opposed to labelling and advertising regulations."). Lack of inquiry into the effectiveness of
alternative, less trade-restrictive measures appears to be a feature of GATT panel analysis be-
cause "no GATT panel has required that the proposed alternative measure be as effective as the
measure actually employed." Dunoff (note 222), 1063.
233 "Thailand contended that the prohibition on imports of cigarettes was justified by the
objective of public health policy which it was pursuing, namely to reduce the consumption of
tobacco which was harmful to health .... smoking lowered the standard of living, increased
sickness and thereby led to billions of dollars being spent every year on medical costs, which
reduced real income and prevented an efficient use being made of resources, human and natu-
ral." Thai Cigarette Case (note 36), para. 21.
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to the tobacco trade but a disaster to public health. In short, a balance between
public health sovereignty and foreign trade interests did not exist.
Under a rule of reason approach, the outcome in the Thai cigarette case might
have been different and more beneficial to public health. Given that Thailand easily
established the scientific justification for tobacco control measures, the question then
becomes whether the import ban constitutes an unreasonable restraint on inter-
national trade in the circumstances of the case. A powerful argument could be made
that such an import ban imposed by a developing country vulnerable to the econom-
ic power of multinational tobacco companies selling a dangerous product is a rea-
sonable restraint on international trade from a public health perspective."' The his-
tory of developing countries in Latin America and Asia experiencing worse smoking
problems after market penetration by Western tobacco companies solidifies the
reasonableness of the import ban as a SPS measure. Unlike the formalistic and ab-
stract approach of the GATT panel in the Thai Cigarette Case, the rule of reason ap-
proach is sensitive to context; and this sensitivity gives public health policy more
options and flexibility in establishing SPS measures. The rule of reason approach re-
stores equilibrium between public health sovereignty and international trade inter-
ests.
A possible concern about the rule of reason approach to the necessary requirement
in the SPS Agreement relates to the case-by-case nature of the approach. WTO panels
will be in the position of fashioning a 'common law' of necessity in SPS cases.235 In
fashioning this common law of necessity, WTO panels will have to develop guide-
lines in operating the rule of reason approach. Clearly one of the items WTO panels
would have to consider is the likely public health effects of alternative and less trade-
restrictive measures. The GATT panel in the Thai Cigarette Case never took such ef-
fects into consideration. If this had been a consideration in the Thai Cigarette Case,
then the result would have been different given the overwhelming evidence from
other countries that the less trade-restrictive measures suggested by the GATT panel
would not have protected public health in Thailand. In addition, WTO panels should
include in any rule of reason analysis consideration of the dangerousness of the pro-
duct in question. The more inherently dangerous a product, such as tobacco, the
WTO panel should place less emphasis on reducing trade restrictions and more em-
phasis on public health protection.
The facts of the Thai cigarette case and the dangerous nature of tobacco consump-
tion may make the rule of reason approach look very attractive, but WTO panels
234 See Thaveechaiyagarn (note 202), 384 - 385.
235 A tik argues that "[a]ssuming a flow of dispute resolution decisions under the WTO and
NAFTA, there may come to be a 'common law' of scientific determinations." A tik (note 111),
755. The same point applies to the interpretation of the necessary requirement in the SPS
Agreement.
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may confront harder cases. There may be situations where the health risks of a pro-
duct might be very controversial and where the health ramifications of less trade-re-
strictive measures are unclear. How does the rule of reason approach work in these
harder SPS cases? Should the balance be struck in favor of public health sovereignty
by deferring to the State that enacted the measure or in favor of international trade
by requiring a less trade-restrictive measure? In short, it may be difficult in some cases
to determine whether a scientifically-justified SPS measure imposes an unreasonable
burden on international trade in the particular circumstances because there are few
clear parameters guiding such a decision.
Perhaps some insight can be gained by looking to the EC law principle of propor-
tionality. Under Article 36 of the EC Treaty, EC member States can restrict the free-
dom of movement of goods in order to protect, among other things, public health.236
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) reviews trade-restricting public health measures
to evaluate whether they have a disproportionate impact on intra-EC trade. While
this sounds like a reasonableness standard, the proportionality principle in EC law is
actually closer to the traditional GATT interpretation of 'necessary'. Under the pro-
portionality principle, "a measure may not restrict trade between Member States
more than is necessary to achieve its legitimate object."237 The ECJ has ruled that
"[n]ational rules or practices do not fall within the exception specified in Article 36
if the health and life of humans can [be] as effectively protected by measures which
do not restrict intra-Community trade so much."238 This formulation reminds one of
the least trade-restrictive interpretation of GATT's necessary requirement. If em-
phasis is placed on the concept 'effectively protected' in the proportionality prin-
ciple, then perhaps room for consideration of context, as suggested by the rule of rea-
son approach, is possible. But splitting hairs in EC law interpretation probably will
not get us very far given the peculiar nature of the EC project of building a single
market, which is not an objective of the WTO. The ECJ historically has reviewed all
Article 36 claims very strictly in terms of their impact on intra-EC trade.23 The same
strictness may not be the proper course within the WTO, as suggested by the Thai
Cigarette Case.
One way to establish a WTO rule of reason approach is to develop a presumption
that a scientific justification for a SPS measure makes the trade-restrictive aspects of
23 EC Treaty, in: European Union: Selected Instruments Taken from the Treaties, vol. 1,
1995, 91, Art. 36.
237 Peter Oliver, Free Movement of Goods in the European Community under Articles 30
to 36 of the Rome Treaty, 3rd. ed. 1996, 185.
238 Case 104/75, Adriaan de Peijper, 1976 ECR 613, 636.
239 Paul Craig/Grdinne de Bsrca, EC Law: Text, Cases, & Materials, 1995, 605. See al-
so Barcel6 (note 144), 771 -772 (describing rigorous ECJ cost-benefit balancing test in propor-
tionality principle).
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such a measure reasonable and thus necessary in terms of GATT. The presumption
could be overcome by the complaining party demonstrating that the burden of the
scientifically-based SPS measure on international trade is unreasonable. This burden
of proof might be satisfied by establishing that the SPS measure in question does not
address any real health threat while seriously disrupting international trade flows.
The costs to international trade would have to grossly outweigh speculative health
benefits in the enacting State. In essence, the complaining State would have to prove
that (1) the SPS measure bears no rational relationship to the health objective despite
having a scientific basis, and (2) the measure seriously disrupts international trade.
Rather than being a nearly impossible standard to satisfy, the 'necessary' requirement
would be a less stringent standard of review.24 The trade-related disciplines of 'no
unjustified discrimination' and 'no disguised restriction' on international trade still
remain to keep SPS measures in conformity with fundamental GATT principles.241
Does the BeefHormones Case offer any support for the development of a rule of
reason approach to the necessary requirement in the SPS Agreement? The incorpora-
tion of the traditional GATT interpretation of 'necessary' into Articles 2.2 and 5.6 of
the SPS Agreement poses an obstacle to the development of a rule of reason approach
in SPS Agreement cases. Because neither the panel nor the Appellate Body addressed
Articles 2.2 or 5.6 substantively, the BeefHormones Case offers no direct indication
that the WTO is inclined to move away from the traditional GATT interpretation
of necessary towards a rule of reason approach.
The Appellate Body's interpretations of risk assessment do, however, bring the
controversy about the necessary requirement alive. As discussed earlier, the Appellate
Body held that a member State does not have to establish any minimum magnitude
of risk in conducting a risk assessment.242 Thus, a SPS measure can be legitimate when
supported by a very small risk as long as there is "a rational relationship between the
measure and the risk assessment." 243 Interpreting the SPS Agreement not to require
any threshold level of risk be established raises the question how to prevent member
States from seriously disrupting international trade through SPS measures protecting
against low-probability risks. The 'necessary' and 'not more trade-restrictive than
required' standards in Articles 2.2 and 5.6 respectively stand as potential disciplines
against measures significantly restricting international trade to protect against low-
probability risks. While the facts of the Thai Cigarette Case (high-probability risk
from importation of an inherently dangerous product into a developing country)
240 As Schoenbaum argues, the rule of reason approach "will effectively lower the threshold
required to satisfy the exception in Article XX(b)." Schoenbaum (note 7), 277.
241 Id. ("The lower threshold is appropriate because of the possibility of applying the
chapeau [of Article XX].").
242 Hormones Appellate Report (note 13), para. 186.
243 Id., para. 193.
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support a rule of reason approach, the Beef Hormones Case suggests that the tradi-
tional necessary discipline is more attractive in cases involving low-probability risks
from importation of products not inherently dangerous.
Assuming that the EC's next risk assessment establishes a very low-probability risk
from hormone-treated meat, the EC will have satisfied the science-based disciplines of
the SPS Agreement under the Hormones Appellate Report. The question would then
be whether some less trade-restrictive measure than an import ban would reasonably
be available to the EC to achieve its appropriate level of health protection. Respond-
ing to United States and Canadian arguments that the panel erred in not finding the
EC in violation of Article 5.6, the EC argued that only a total import ban would
achieve the objective of ensuring "that consumers are not exposed to any residues of
hormones used for growth promotion purposes.""' Given the lengths that the Ap-
pellate Body went to in its interpretations of Articles 3 and 5 of the SPS Agreement
to emphasize the public health sovereignty of member States, it seems questionable
that the WTO would apply Articles 2.2 and 5.6 as rigorously as GATT and WTO
panels have applied the necessary requirement of Article XX(b). Thus, the Hormones
Appellate Report could be interpreted as indirectly setting the stage for a more
lenient approach to the necessary requirement in SPS cases.24
This leniency will not, however, develop necessarily into a rule of reason ap-
proach. What is more likely is the development of a standard that falls somewhere in
between the rule of reason approach and the traditional, strict interpretation of
necessary in Article XX(b). Such a standard would probably have to involve WTO
panels paying close attention to the less trade-restrictive alternative measures allegedly
available and evaluating them for their technical and economic feasibility, their
potential to achieve the appropriate level of health protection, and their trade-re-
strictiveness. Panel deliberations of alternative measures under Articles 2.2 and 5.6
are, thus, likely to be more detailed and comprehensive than GATT panel considera-
tions of possible less trade-restrictive alternatives under Article XX(b). The Appellate
Body suggested as much in refusing to address Article 5.6 because it argued that "it
cannot be assumed that all findings of fact necessary to proceed to a determination of
consistency or inconsistency of the EC measures with the requirements of Article 5.6
have been made by the Panel, which Article also provides that 'technical and eco-
nomic feasibility' should be taken into account. "246
In sum, the likely impact of the BeefHormones Case on the 'necessary' trade disci-
pline is that WTO panels will begin to demonstrate greater sensitivity to arguments
244 Id., para. 83.
24 This analysis again points to the Appellate Body distancing the SPS Agreement from
Article XX(b) of GATT. What in effect may have happened is that the Appellate Body has
undertaken a radical re-interpretation of Article XX(b) through the SPS Agreement.
246 Hormones Appellate Report (note 13), para. 251.
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and counterarguments about possible less trade-restrictive alterative measures. WTO
panels cannot adopt a rule of reason approach given the express language of Articles
2.2 and 5.6 and the prior Article XX(b) interpretations, but the Appellate Body's
clear recognition of public health sovereignty in its interpretations of Articles 3 and
5 suggests that WTO panels will not repeat the approach taken to alternative meas-
ures in the Thai Cigarette Case. Just as the Appellate Body steered a middle course
between deference and de novo review in setting the appropriate standard of review
for scientific evidence, the Appellate Body appears to have pointed to, if not actually
blazed, a via media between the deferential rule of reason approach and the very
strict least trade-restrictive alternative approach under Article XX(b). Such a via
media might be, in the Appellate Body's words, "essential for the maintenance of the
delicate and carefully negotiated balance in the SPS Agreement between the shared,
but sometimes competing, interests of promoting international trade and of pro-
tecting the life and health of human beings. ,
247
V. Paradigm Lost? The Future of the Trade-Health Linkage
The global public health crises of emerging infectious diseases and the tobacco
pandemic will keep the trade-health linkage front and center in international health
law and international trade law. Given the central role of the science paradigm in
both of these areas of international law, the future of the trade-health linkage depends
greatly on how the paradigm operates. In this Part V, I explore the future of the
science paradigm in international health law and international trade law.
1. International Health Law
a) Infectious Diseases
Since 1951, the IHR have served as the only set of international legal rules directly
concerned with the prevention of the spread of infectious diseases.24 As elaborated
earlier, the IHR embody the science paradigm; but the member States of WTIO have
rendered the IHR ineffective by (1) not keeping them relevant to the changing nature
of the infectious disease threat, and (2) routinely violating them. The WHO is cur-
rently preparing a revision of the IHR to make them more relevant to the era of
EIDs, but the proposed principles guiding the revision have left commentators
247 Id., para. 177 (describing requirements of Articles 5.1 and 2.2).
248 World Health Organization, Division of Emerging and Other Communicable Diseases
Surveillance and Control, Emerging and Other Communicable Diseases Strategic Plan 1996 -
2000, 1996, WHO/EMC/96.1, 10 (the IHR constitute the "only international health agreement
on communicable diseases that is binding on [WHO] Member States.").
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unimpressed.249 A particular weakness of the IHR revision principles is no apparent
desire to improve compliance with the Regulations. While the science paradigm will
get an overhaul in the move from reporting just three diseases to reporting disease
syndromes,50 WHO has not indicated publicly that it will attempt to improve com-
pliance with reporting duties through monitoring and enforcement."' Nor has it
publicly confronted the problem of how to deal with excessive measures taken by
WHO member States in violation of the IHR. s2 All of which suggests the revised
IHR may create an improved science paradigm that again is lost in the more irra-
tional world of international politics.
The WHO might fruitfully explore how to utilize the WTO and the SPS Agree-
ment to shore up the revised 1-R. Historically, excessive measures taken by WHO
member States seriously affected international trade."3 The maximum measures pro-
vided in the IHR are based on scientific principles, which suggests that excessive
measures are suspect scientifically. These excessive measures could be challenged un-
der the SPS Agreement as lacking a scientific justification. The IHR and WHO state-
ments on the excessive measures in question could be powerful ammunition under
the SPS Agreement in demonstrating that the measures lacked a scientific basis. The
WHO does not necessarily need to build into the revised IR an entire enforcement
regime, but it could build the necessary bridges that would allow excessive measures
to be challenged successfully under the SPS Agreement. In short, the revision of the
IHR has an opportunity to link trade and health synergistically in pursuit of the ob-
jective of the maximum protection against the international spread of disease with
minimum interference with world trade. The international health law and interna-
tional trade law regimes would, thus, blend together in an overarching trade-health
system. Such a coordinated approach could help health and trade experts secure a
249 See Fidler (note 22), 851 - 863; David P. Fidler, Mission Impossible? Emerging Infectious
Diseases and International Law, Temple International & Comparative Law Journal, vol. 10,
1996, 493; and Taylor (note 136), 1346 - 1360. But see Bruce Jay Plotkin, Mission Possible: The
Future of the International Health Regulations, Temple International & Comparative Law
Journal, vol. 10, 1996, 503.
20 The Revision of the International Health Regulations (note 114), 234 ("The current role
and function of the IHR should be revised and expanded, particularly the practice of imme-
diate reporting of only 3 specific diseases which should be replaced by immediate reporting to
WHO of defined syndromes representing disease occurrence of international importance.").
251 Taylor (note 136), 1352 ("It is highly doubtful whether the revisions suggested by WHO's
expert committee will adequately address the problems of noncompliance...").
2s2Fidler (note 22), 858 (discussing weakness in WHO plans to educate member States better
about excessive measures).
2s3 David P. Fidler/David L. Heymann/Stephen M. Ostroff/Terry P. O'Brien, Law and Emerg-
ing and Re-Emerging Infectious Diseases: Challenges for International, National, and State
Law, The International Lawyer, vol. 31, 1997, 773, 778 (noting huge economic losses suffered
by Peru and India from WHO member States applying excessive measures).
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more appropriate balance in the trade-health linkage and avoid having the linkage
degenerate into trade versus health.
b) Framework Convention on International Tobacco Control
A second important item on the horizon of international health law is the devel-
opment of the proposed framework convention on international tobacco control.
The substance of the actual framework convention and the specific issues that might
be addressed in the protocols to it are not yet clear because the WHO initiative on
the convention is still very young. The convention will, however, have to address the
global tobacco trade. Derek Yach has argued that the "growing international support
for an international convention on tobacco control.., will in all likelihood require
tobacco and tobacco products to be exempted from the terms of the World Trade
Organization."254 Removing tobacco from the WTO regime will be a very con-
troversial undertaking given the long-standing efforts by the United States and other
tobacco-exporting countries to pry open new markets. Unless trade in tobacco is
directly confronted, protocols on labeling, advertising, or educational campaigns will
be vulnerable to the rapacity of multinational tobacco companies in the same way
that similar domestic legislation in developing countries has been powerless to stop
the growth of tobacco consumption. But no one should have any doubts about the
difficulty of including trade regulations in the proposed tobacco framework/protocol
strategy because of the historical behavior of the United States and multinational
tobacco companies."'
The recent proposed U.S. domestic tobacco litigation settlement2 . has fortunately
caused people to re-examine U.S. tobacco export efforts. In July 1997, legislation was
introduced in both the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate proposing to make
American tobacco exports and American tobacco advertising overseas subject to the
254 Derek Yacb, Progress in Achieving International Tobacco Control: Output of the 4 8'h
World Health Assembly, Geneva, May 1995, Tobacco Control, vol. 4, 1995, 278, 278.
25 An ironic story illustrates in a small way the uphill fight against global tobacco consump-
tion. Yach reported that at the World Health Assembly meeting in 1995 at which delegates
supported global tobacco control efforts "[t]here was an almost continuous presence of tobacco
smoke at gathering points outside the main meeting halls of the World Health Assembly. Ash-
trays sponsored by tobacco companies were prominently displayed and used even by Ministers
of Health from a wide variety of countries. No attempt was made by WHO officials to try to
implement a ban on smoking within meeting areas." Id.
256 U.S. Tobacco Settlement Proposal, available at < http://stic.neu.edu/settlement/6-20-
settle.htm >.
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restrictions on labeling and advertising in effect in the United States.25 The Senate
version of the legislation also would prevent the United States Trade Representative
"from undermining another country's tobacco restrictions if those restrictions are
applied to both foreign and domestic products in the same manner."2"8 The House of
Representatives' bill would prohibit federal funds from being used by the U.S. gov-
ernment to seek to remove or reduce foreign countries' restrictions on tobacco pro-
ducts or to promote tobacco exports." 9 In introducing the Senate bill, Senator Lau-
tenberg starkly characterized past U.S. trade policy on tobacco:
Mr. President, the success tobacco companies have had in selling death overseas is not solely
due to their own efforts. In the past, the U.S. Government assisted U.S. tobacco companies
in hooking foreigners by using trade policy to dismantle foreign tobacco regulations, such
as advertising bans, in several key markets. While most of this assistance occurred in the
1980s, its effects are felt today. Japan, South Korea, Thailand, and Taiwan were on the other
side of this dispute with our Government over their antitobacco laws. They lost, their citi-
zens lost, and the U.S. tobacco companies won. Smoking in these countries is higher as a
result of past action by the U.S. Trade Representative.
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The strength of such anti-tobacco sentiments in Congress was revealed in Novem-
ber 1997 when Congress passed and the President signed an appropriations statute
that prohibits the use of any of the appropriated funds "to promote the sale or export
of tobacco or tobacco products, or to seek the reduction or removal by any foreign
country of restrictions on the marketing of tobacco or tobacco products, except for
restrictions which are not applied to all tobacco or tobacco products of the same
type. '2 61 While this provision represents the first time "Congress has restricted em-
ployees of the government from contesting health regulations designed to reduce
2 7 See U.S. House of Representatives bill H.R. 2135, "The International Tobacco Responsi-
bility Act of 1997"; and U.S. Senate bill S. 1060, "The Worldwide Tobacco Disclosure Act of
1997."
258 Congressional Record, vol. 143, S7950-4, S7959 (statement of Senator Lautenberg). Sena-
tor Lautenberg's emphasis on the non-discriminatory application of domestic tobacco regula-
tions fits well with the rule of reason approach to the necessary requirement outlined earlier in
the paper. Senator Lautenberg's proposed legislation does not require that other countries adopt
the least trade-restrictive tobacco regulations. Senator Lautenberg states that his proposed legis-
lation conforms to the Thai cigarette ruling because the GATT panel "held that member
nations can use various policies to protect health as long as they are applied evenly to domestic
and foreign products". Id. The GATT panel's ruling in the Thai Cigarette Case did not, how-
ever, turn on a violation of a non-discrimination principle but on the 'necessary' requirement
of Article XX(b).
259 U.S. House of Representatives bill H.R. 2135, S 5.
260 Congressional Record (note 258).
261 An Act Making Appropriations for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State,
the Judiciary, and Related Agencies for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 1998 and For
Other Purposes, U.S. Public Law 105 - 119, S 618. See Congressional Record, vol. 143, H8009 -
H8013 for statements in the House of Representatives on this provision.
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smoking in other countries,"262 the provision does not actually bar the United States
from attacking foreign tobacco control laws resembling those attacked in Thailand
because they do not treat domestic and foreign tobacco and tobacco products equally,
as required by the statute. While, legally, challenges to foreign tobacco laws that
violate the principle of national treatment are still possible, politically such challenges
will be very difficult to mount with such laws on the books.
The anti-tobacco activity in the United States indicates that the framework/proto-
col strategy on international tobacco regulation will have to confront the global to-
bacco trade or the situation will continue to be one where trade prevails over public
health as has already happened throughout the developing world. In many respects,
the framework/protocol strategy on international tobacco regulation has to create a
more powerful science paradigm for tobacco-related diseases in international health
law and a deeper commitment to the paradigm for global public health progress to be
made. The nagging fear is, however, that the creation of such a paradigm now the
global tobacco pandemic is well under way may well be lost in the smoke increasing-
ly inhaled and exhaled in the global village.
Potential synergy exists between the proposed tobacco framework/protocol strate-
gy and international trade law. As the international consensus against tobacco con-
sumption builds through the framework/protocol effort, WTO panels might give
more weight to public health concerns in tobacco trade disputes (and possibly other
SPS disputes) than the GATT panel in the Thai Cigarette Case. As with the IHR, the
WHO should be building bridges with the WTO regarding tobacco in a compre-
hensive effort to link trade and health.
2. International Trade Law
The future of the trade-health linkage in international trade law depends upon the
direction of a number of developments. The most fundamental area will be the in-
terpretations of the SPS Agreement rendered by WTO panels because these decisions
will form the 'common law' of the trade-health linkage. How bridges are built be-
tween international health law and international trade law, as suggested above, will
determine whether WTO panel interpretations move away from the public health
myopia witnessed in the Thai Cigarette Case. In addition, great questions remain
about (1) how the science paradigm is affected by its politicization, (2) how WTO
panels will deal with making scientific decisions under the politicized science para-
digm, and (3) how WTO panels interpret the 'necessary' trade discipline in the SPS
Agreement.
262 Congress Bars Taxpayer Support for Big Tobacco in Appropriations Measure, Press Re-
lease from Lloyd Doggett (Democrat-Texas), 14 November 1997, available at < http://www.
house.gov/doggett/prl 11497.htm >.
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The great danger in the international trade law area is that the science paradigm
becomes, or becomes perceived to be, a facade for greedy trade interests rather than
the traditional way of balancing trade and health objectives. If the development of
international standards and the nature of national scientific research become, or be-
come perceived to be, dominated by powerful trade interests, then the science para-
digm will be seen as a sell-out to economics over health. If WTO panels continue to
rely on the traditional interpretation of 'necessary', the 'common law' of the trade-
health linkage may be rejected by many as anti-health; and the science paradigm will
be perceived to be subordinate to the trade-related disciplines in the trade-health
linkage.
Conclusion
The globalization of public health forces States to cooperate to deal with global
health threats. The problem of emerging infectious diseases and the global tobacco
pandemic pose serious public health problems all over the planet, but especially in
the developing world. The processes of globalization, particularly international trade,
act as stimulants for these global health threats. A key aspect of the need for inter-
national cooperation in facing the globalization of public health is finding ways to
balance public health sovereignty and international trade interests. Striking the trade-
health balance is an old challenge that dates back at least to the mid-nineteenth
century, but its age does not dilute the relevance that it has as the new millennium
approaches. Since the late nineteenth century, science has been at the center of the
balancing efforts in international health law. In international trade law, science has
more recently been given a similar role. In both areas of international law, the science
paradigm dominates the trade-health balancing act. Science has become the standard
against which national public health measures are evaluated. Science sets the standards
that form the basis for international regulatory harmonization. Science becomes insti-
tutionalized in international organizations as they attempt to balance public health
sovereignty and international trade.
The science paradigm does not, however, live up to science myths. The paradigm
is subject to the machinations of States in international politics, which erodes our vi-
sion of the paradigm as an objective and universal source of wisdom perfectly balanc-
ing health and trade in international relations. The concerns about the science para-
digm are serious and have to be faced forthrightly, but the concerns do not neces-
sarily mean that the science paradigm is without merit in the continuing trade-health
relationship. The fact that science has for over 100 years been at the center of the
trade-health linkage suggests it has both deep appeal and practical value. The science
paradigm promises to remain the center of gravity in the trade-health linkage.
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Science is not, of course, the only feature of the trade-health linkage. As illustrated
by the analysis of the trade-related disciplines of GATT and the SPS Agreement, non-
discriminatory application of scientifically-based SPS measures remains mandatory in
international trade law. The non-discrimination principles dovetail nicely with the
science paradigm because discriminatory application of SPS measures often makes
little public health sense when the risks posed in the two situations are the same.
More problematic is the interpretation of 'necessary' because upon the interpretation
of this term hinges the nature of the balance between trade and health in interna-
tional trade law. The traditional GATT interpretation, found in the Thai Cigarette
Case, subordinates public health to international trade, which produces not balance
but disequilibrium. What has happened to tobacco consumption in Thailand and
other developing countries proves that trade interests were allowed to run roughshod
over public health objectives. Re-establishing equilibrium requires emphasis on the
science paradigm and the maintenance of its purpose.
In the eras of the globalization of public health witnessed since the mid-nineteenth
century, trade and health have been and currently are in tension. It is an unavoidable
tension because of the structure of the international system and the nature of human
diseases. As international trade continues to increase, and as global health crises de-
velop, the tension will become acute. The political pressures on the science paradigm
are becoming intense as the trade and health stakes are raised by the globalization of
markets and of public health. In such an environment, matters can quickly deterio-
rate as trade and health factions square off for battle. The outcome of the battle is,
however, known: at the end of the day trade and health will still be linked, but much
damage may be done to the spirit and stamina needed in the delicate balancing of
trade and health interests.
Diseases spread through trade by land and by sea have shaped the course of human
history. Emerging infectious diseases and the global tobacco pandemic are merely the
latest chapters in this ancient saga. The horrible human death and suffering on the
horizon because of these two great global health crises should be sobering motivation
to maintain perspective and to sharpen our determination to find sustainable and
creative ways to coordinate trade and health in all areas of international law.
